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Covering Conjectures:
The Intellectual (Hypointellectual)
Bleeds into the Hyperintellectual

I am not impressed with those who call themsel-

Abstract
Although hypointellectuals have long
been a part of our cultural landscape,
it is in post-conflict societies, such
as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, that
there has arisen a strong need for a
different breed of intellectual, one
who is more than simply a social critic, an educator, a person of action, and
a compassionate individual. Enter the
non-partisan intellectual—the hyperintellectual. It is the hyperintellectual, whose non-partisanship is
manifested through a reciprocating
critique and defense of both the nationalist enterprise and strong interventionism of the International
Community, who strives to create a
climate of understanding and to enlarge the moral space so as to reduce
the divisiveness between opposing
parties. It is in this way that the hyperintellectual acts as a catalyst for
the creation of a democratic culture
within the civil societies of Bosnia
and Kosovo.

Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

ves intellectuals, or, better yet, public intellectuals.
The word has become a worn-out title that is often
appropriated by those who simply gibber on social
media platforms about the politics and economics
of the day. Of course, this is not totally unrelated to
the word’s late-19th century French origin. Coined
during the Dreyfus affair, the word came to refer to
those thinkers, people like Emile Zola and André
Gide, who were willing to intervene in a public forum even if it meant risk to their personal well-being (Le Sueur 2001: 2; see also Drake 2005 and
Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997). Risky as their
acts were, acts which required a certain amount of
courage to pull off, it is the “publicity” of these acts
that gives us cause to label the Zolas and Gides of
the world as “public intellectuals.” The American
jurist and legal theorist Richard Posner puts it nicely. Public intellectuals are those who take a serious interest in “matters of general public concern
of...a political or ideological cast” and who express
themselves “in a way that is accessible to the public” (2003: 35). And so both Zola and Gide came
© 2016 Global Outlook
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forward to make their views known, perhaps serving as the conscience of French
society, and propelled by the belief that
one cannot walk away from some miscarriages of justice.
Yet one person’s miscarriage of justice
is another’s justice (or, in the case of Alfred
Dreyfus, another person’s prejudice) as
evidenced by the deep division that the
Dreyfus affair created in France during the
1890s and early 1900s, with some thinkers, such as the anti-Semite Edouard
Drumont, publically condemning Dreyfus.
This shows that not every public intellectual was reading from the same script,
some were oppositional while others were
curatorial in their response to the prejudices of the time. Revolutionaries as well as
reactionaries populated the scene.
Although the days of the French Third
Republic are long gone, public intellectuals and those who take an interest in them
continue to be plentiful, as well those
public intellectuals who turn their gaze
upon themselves in the hope of making
sense of their own kind (which includes
someone like Posner).
It is safe to say that with so many interested parties, it is not surprising that
there is an enormous body of literature on
public intellectuals. I, for one, have looked
at only a tiny fraction of the corpus. Besides its sheer size, the literature is also
quite varied in its conceptions of the intellectual.1 Yet there are common threads
To get a feel for the literature, see, for example, Aronowitz (2012); Bamyeh (2012);
Benda (1928); Bender (1997); Etzioni and
Bowditch (2006); Faflak and Haslam (2013);
Hollander (1998); Jacoby (1987); Jennings
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of meaning among those conceptions.
Influential twentieth century thinkers
like the Palestinian literary theorist and
cultural critic Edward Said, the French
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the French
existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, and the
American political philosopher Michael
Walzer are among those who have contributed significantly, each highlighting
some of these threads.2
The language of threads adopted here
is not meant to indicate support for either
an essentialist or intersectionist theory of
identity of the intellectual, though I find
the latter to possess more explanatory
power than the former. What it does indicate, however, is that I am treating the
question “What is an intellectual?” like
“What is a taxi driver?” It is a question
about the set of observable conditions
that are sufficient for someone to be a
public intellectual. The problem with this
treatment is there are far fewer clear-cut
cases of public intellectuals than there are
clear-cut cases of taxi drivers. This is because the objections to a specific person
being an intellectual will likely mount,
while the reverse is likely to be true with
those who are said to be taxi drivers.
This should be no surprise given a cursory reading of Said, Ricoeur, Sartre, and
and Kemp-Welch (1997); Johnson (2007);
Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman (2003);
Posner (2003); Poyner (2006); Shils (1972);
Small (2002); and Sowell (2012).
2
Said, Sartre, and Walzer are examples of the
sort of self-reflective public intellectual that
was previously noted. Ricoeur, on the other
hand, was more inclined to write for an audience made up of fellow academics, including
professional philosophers.
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Walzer suggests that there are many uses
of the word ‘intellectual’ compared to that
of ‘taxi driver’: for example, the intellectual is viewed as a critical outsider by
Said, as a political educator by Ricoeur,
as a person of action by Sartre, and as a
caring insider by Walzer as compared to
a person who makes a living by driving a
taxi.3 Yet these threads, when taken together, constitute what I believe to be an
adequate definition of one type of runof-the-mill intellectual or hypointellectual (its binomen being Publicus intellectualis hypo). There are many other types,
some of whom may not only be a little
less critical, less educating, less active,
and/or less caring, but may not possess
much of any of these threads. Such an
intellectual would be just another runof-the-mill intellectual, albeit a severe
type of hypointellectual. I am not in the
least interested in this “ugly” intellectual,
and am not very interested in its more
robust counterpart, except insofar as it
represents the intellectual who is once
removed from the centerpiece of this
work, the quirky intellectual, who I refer
to as the hyperintellectual (Publicus intellectualis hyper). The quirkiness (or q-ness)
of the hyperintellectual is derived from a
commitment to non-partisanship (a lack
of bias qua one-sidedness but not an absence of perspectivism), which places the
hyperintellectual in sharp contrast with
the hypointellectual. It is in this sense
An instance of a taxi driver may not be as
clear-cut as it appears. We may consider those
drivers of cars with pink moustaches who give
rides free of charge in Omaha, Nebraska as
fuzzy cases.

3
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that the hyperintellectual is an “anti-intellectual,” the ‘anti’ signifying the hyperintellectual’s non-partisanship that makes
him or her less predictable and formulaic
than the hypointellectual.
Describing intellectuals in the way
that I have, however, fails to mention the
space within which they operate, i.e., civil
society. ‘Space’ is an abstract term that
has more than one meaning and one referent, including the space that computers and the Internet have given us access
to—the electronic medium of cyberspace.
Yet space is nonetheless readily accessible to us because it is part of our everyday speech and lived experience. We talk
about and experience space in different
ways, one way being “as that which allows
movement” (Tuan 1977: 6). We enter into
it and we exit it; we smell, taste, feel, see,
and communicate as we make our way
through it. Once we pause, that location
becomes a place like the one at which
civil society is made real. Of course, real
does not always mean humane and supportive of human development, democracy, and peace. Civil society as the space
of human association and relational networks is often made toxic by the xenophobia and chauvinism reflected in hate
speech and violence. Yet civil society is
sometimes the wellspring for a culture
of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and
the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts; the sort of culture that embodies
the attitudes and values of democratization. Political instrumentalities like freedom of expression; free, fair, and frequent
elections; and procedures to bring about
peaceful change are crucial for democ-
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racy, but they are only as effective as the
culture that binds them. It is civil society
that provides the space within which culture shapes how people behave politically.
What we find today are civil societies
that harbor a mosaic of political cultures
in continuous tension with one another,
with some cultures being more supportive
of democracy than others. For the most
part, pluralism comes with its own risks of
repeated contestation. “When we discover that there are several cultures instead
of just one and consequently at the time
when we acknowledge the end of a sort of
cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real,”
as Ricoeur reminds us, “we are threatened
with the destruction of our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that
there are just others, that we ourselves are
an ‘other’ among others” (1965: 278). And
with all those others the possibility for
disagreement and antagonism, and occasionally violence, is but a human constant.
It strikes me that of all the “shakers and
movers” of culture, the hypointellectual is
no less important an actor than the rest of
the lot in well-developed democratic civil
societies, like those in the United States,
France, Denmark, and Sweden. When it
comes to the United States, Posner locates what he calls “the market for public
intellectuals” (Posner 2003: 41-82). It is
a marketplace inhabited by the likes of
Noam Chomsky, Cornell West, and Paul
Krugman. The hypointellectual is also an
important actor in civil societies that are
far less democratic; sometimes working
on behalf of and sometimes struggling
against the time honored constraints of
authoritarianism (the People’s Republic

of China, North Korea, and the Russian
Federation come to mind).
Although the hypointellectual dominates many societies as a force for either
the status quo or for social change, I find
extraordinary value in the hyperintellectual. This is even true in well-developed
democratic civil societies where there
continues to be a need for an intellectual who is more than simply a social critic, an educator, a person of action, and a
compassionate individual who favors one
side over another. However, it is within
post-conflict societies, such as those in
Kosovo and Bosnia, that there exists an
urgent need for the hyperintellectual.
What is distinctive about the hyperintellectual is the degree to which this intellectual conducts social criticism, political
education, action, and “caring insiderism”
not as an ideologue, but as a non-partisan. The tasks of criticism, education, and
the rest are conducted in a non-partisan
way such that what is objectionable and
defensible within each opposing camp is
given voice.4 Although the hyperintellect
may appear to be affiliated with a particular group simply because their position on
an issue is the same as that of the group
in question, it is just that, an appearance.
Over the course of time, while examining a host of issues, the hyperintellectual
After all is said and done, however, there
may not be a “best” voice that results from
reasoning and impartial scrutiny. As Sen so
succinctly notes: “[e]ven the most vigorous of
critical examination can still leave conflicting
and competing arguments that are not eliminated by impartial scrutiny” (2009: x). Perhaps we should be satisfied with a new voice
that is simply more reasonable.

4
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will be seen to have shifted “affiliations”
from one group to another to another,
siding with conservatives one day, liberals the next, and socialists the following
day. This shifting, however, is evidence
that the hyperintellectual is not beholden to any one stakeholder, whether it is
a party, organization, or government. This
is especially important for the building of
post-conflict civil societies like Kosovo
and Bosnia because the hyperintellectual is seen as “having no dog in the fight,”
thus as someone who is sincere about reducing the divisiveness between peoples.
Whether the tension is between ethnic
nationalists themselves; between them
and the strong interventionists from within the International Community (IC);
or between the governed and their corrupt, inept, and greedy elected officials
and their functionaries—a new set of
boogie men, it can all be addressed by the
hyperintellectual so that there is at least a
growing sense of communities.
It is worth remarking that to appreciate the pervasiveness and malevolence
of the divisiveness caused by ethnic nationalism is to recognize how personal
and group identities are intimately bound
to the Other and Otherness.5 No wonder
Sari Nusseibeh (2011) recognizes that “‘being Hamas’ or ‘being Palestinian’…may become such a powerful marker of her identity
that she ceases to think of herself—to define
herself—except in terms of belonging to that
party or movement or category” (106). Yet he
makes it clear that group identities do not
always take precedence over personal identities; furthermore, that “human identities are
not pre-set or static but are constantly being
shaped or formed by conscious acts of will”
(211).
5
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nationalist elites of all sorts have matter-of-factly Othered one another; this
being no less true of nationalists in Kosovo
and Bosnia. However, there is more to the
Othering process that meets the eye, for
at a much deeper level, the process is a reflection of a “hierarchical” ontology (i.e.,
the set of things and relationships that
are said to exist in the world), which casts
the categories of ethnicity and religion as
dominant over those of citizenship and
humanity. Juxtaposing one of these categories against another for the sake of
in-group cohesiveness eventually creates
disdain for the ethnicity and religion of
the Other, and thus xenophobic psychology (fear of the Other) and chauvinistic
morality (the moral superiority of one’s
own ethno-religious group) (Conces
2005). It is all the more pernicious when
this ontological-psychological-moral triad is wedded to the history and tradition
of the Balkans.
Unfortunately, interethnic relations
and governance in Kosovo and Bosnia in
some ways have not improved following
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and the
signing of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), more commonly known as
the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), that
brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia.
The xenophobia and chauvinism partly
responsible for thirty years of unrest in
Kosovo and the Bosnian civicide of the
1990s continue to polarize Kosovar and
Bosnian societies, pitting the various
ethnic groups and their leaders against
each other, as well as against the IC and
its strong interventionist efforts in de-
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mocracy building (see Appadurai 2006:
117-118). The current round of tension
includes violent clashes between NATOled KFOR units, as well as EULEX and
Kosovo police units, and Serbs in Serbcontrolled municipalities in North Kosovo
between 2011 and 2012; bomb blasts,
the shooting of a Serb Councilman, and
masked men disrupting a polling center
in north Mitrovica during 2013-14; the
dysfunctionality within the government
of the Bosnian city of Mostar, which was
still without a City Council in April 2015
because of the municipality’s unconstitutional electoral process; and the veiled secessionist rhetoric occasionally delivered
by Milorad Dodik, the president of the
Republika Srpska, and that has put the
IC and some in Sarajevo in a tenuous situation regarding their response to provocations. Then there was the torrent of
protests that took place in February and
March 2014 in Bosnia. The rank and file
of the protestors cut across ethnic lines,
with increasing numbers of Bosniacs,
Croats, and Serbs having become disenchanted with their lives. The Bosnian
Spring began peaceful but became violent, with government buildings in Tuzla
and Zenica, and the presidency building
in Sarajevo going up in flames (Conces
2014). They had reached a breaking point
and were fed up with the country’s high
unemployment (almost 45 percent), endemic poverty, corrupt and ineffective
governance, and the international overseers who perpetuate Bosnia’s “protectorate” status. Who could blame them
for being incensed with the multitude of
elected officials and functionaries who

failed to govern but who nevertheless enjoyed the benefits of a privileged position.
Since then, much of the activity of the
protestors has been channeled into organizing plena—places where people gather
to formulate their demands for change.
But the plena seem to have lost their
momentum, while the imprint of ethnic nationalism and the IC’s influence
remain steadfast in the Balkans. On the
one hand, those with nationalist leanings see the strong interventionism by
the IC as incursions that weaken their
self-determination and undermine their
ethnic identity, a portrayal that casts the
IC’s democracy building efforts in a less
than favorable light. On the other hand,
the IC views the meddling of nationalists as an attempt to undermine Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) which
established the mandate of the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) to ensure peace
and normalcy within Kosovo, as well as
regional stability, and those formal agreements and institutions of democracy building in Bosnia, particularly the DPA. Regardless of whether the various parties
accept responsibility for these incursions
and meddlings, continuous tension between ethnic nationalists themselves, and
between them and the cosmopolitan interventionists, has created an opening for
the hyperintellectual as a transformative
agent between these apparent rivals. As
this essay will make clear, it is the hyperintellectual, who through a reciprocating
critique and defense of the nationalist enterprises and strong interventionism and
the rest, strives to create a climate of un-
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derstanding and an enlargement of moral space so as to reduce the divisiveness
between opponents. Tackling the issue of
moral space is of the utmost importance
because the chauvinistic morality of the
nationalist shrinks or collapses the space
within which people navigate in respectful ways. Enlarging it is achieved in ways
that reflect an inflationary model of morality, one that finds empathy (and hospitality) to be more important than the simple permissiveness of tolerance or, worse
yet, “disengaged toleration,” which is to
say that “you are right in your community
and I am right in mine” (Sen 2009: x). But
this enlargement process is not simply
the creation of a willingness to interact in
close proximity, for it is dependent upon
the ease with which people are able to be
in close proximity with one another. It is
when the environment becomes enriched
in ways that create proximity that the hyperintellectual becomes more of a catalyst
for a democratic culture within the civil
societies of Kosovo and Bosnia.
The remainder of this essay is organized in the following way. In Part I, I
provide an elaboration of the hyperintellectual, one that distinguishes the hyperintellectual from the hypointellectual by
means of a thorough examination of the
“fifth” characteristic of non-partisanship.
Part II offers a definition of civil society
and shows that the hyperintellectual can
serve as a catalyst for democratization
within civil society by creating a climate
of understanding that reduces the divisiveness between opposing parties. Part
III offers a discussion of the inflationary
model of morality, a model that exposes
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

another way in which the hyperintellectual can be a transformative agent for democratization, this time by enlarging the
moral space of rivals. By reflecting on the
nature of moral space, with a focus on its
obstacles as well as remedies, I will show
the importance of hospitality, particularly
as it pertains to the enlargement of moral
space. Part IV acknowledges the bounded
effectiveness of the hyperintellectual.

Rory
J. Conces

Elaborating on the Hyperintellectual

The terms ‘intellectual’ in the late-19th
century and ‘public intellectual’ in the
20th century were coined in an attempt
to label a sort of person who was already
present in the world. On the one hand,
it referred to someone providing a public
defense even at great risk to themselves.
On the other hand, it pointed to someone who was engaged in a public debate
about important concerns and who was
not beholden to the state, the university,
or the media. The 21st century coinage of
‘hyperintellectual’ and ‘hypointellectual’,
however, is not simply about labeling, but
about taxonomy, hence the earlier reference to the hyper and hypo species of the
genus Publicus intellectualis. This taxonomy of intellectuals is both descriptive and
normative. It is descriptive insofar as having defined the hypointellectual in terms
of a broad range of varied magnitudes
of four common attributes and looking
around the world, we find things which
answer to this definition. In fact, the hypointellectual is the most prevalent of intellectuals. The project is also normative
57
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insofar as this run–of-the-mill intellectual is juxtaposed to an intellectual that
we should want to inhabit societies—the
hyperintellectual, a highly endowed hypointellectual who is also a non-partisan.
Stipulating this definition to the word
‘hyperintellectual’ and valuing the presence of a non-partisan intellectual is one
thing, whether there are intellectuals in
the world which answer to this definition
is a matter for another essay. For now it
is enough to lay out in further detail the
characteristics of which the hyperintellectual is a composite. The distinguishing
attribute of non-partisanship will require
a more thorough examination than the
others simply because of the objections
that many have launched against its very
possibility.
A Menagerie of Characteristics…
The first characteristic—that of the social critic—is alluded to by Edward Said
in his Representations of the Intellectual
(1996). “The public role of the intellectual,” declares Said, is “as outsider, ‘amateur,’ and disturber of the status quo”
(1996: x). For Said, being an “insider,” an
“expert,” a “professional” leads one to become more concerned with serving power
and promoting special interests and one’s
career than with speaking the truth, for
speaking the truth requires a readiness
to disturb the status quo. In effect, the
intellectual tends to be an oppositional
figure, one whose consciousness is guided
by dissent rather than accommodation.
By disturbing the status quo, the intellectual breaks down inherited ways of
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viewing the world, those stereotypes and
categories that often hamper our dealings with others. The intellectual strives
to move beyond the easy or the familiar,
to the point of “defamiliarizing” the obvious (Amsterdam and Bruner 2000: 23).
It is the responsibility of the intellectual, declares Said, to “question patriotic
nationalism, corporate thinking, and a
sense of class, racial or gender privilege”
(1996: xiii).6 The intellectual thus offers
the public a message that confronts orthodoxy and represents those segments
of the population that are often forgotten
by those who dominate society. Michel
Foucault iterates this characteristic when
he writes that the role of the intellectual
is “to question over and over again what is
postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and
think things, to dissipate what is familiar
and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions” (1988: 265). For Said, then, the
creation of a disturbance simply reflects
the intellectual’s “oppositionality” (2004:
135) or homelessness.7 It is, as Said sees
it, not so much a matter of leaving one’s
physical home than it is being an exile in
This includes the actions of the whistleblower, actions that provoke a public debate, such
as those of Edward Snowden, to the dismay
of the U.S. intelligence community.
7
Posner (2003: 31) introduces this distinction
between oppositionality and opposition. An
important element of the former is a sense of
moral “homelessness,” something that Theodor Adorno refers to when he writes: “It is
a part of morality not to be at home in one’s
home” (1974: 39). I take oppositionality to be
indicative of a willingness or an urge to search
for that which is morally reasonable.
6
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the sense of being skeptical and critical of
the received opinion of one’s own community.
However, the disturbance created by
the intellectual is not a matter of opposing one dogma with another, of replacing
one ideology with another. And this includes becoming enamored with the ideology of the weak and the downtrodden
in the name of dissent or resistance to the
brutality of imperial power and military
occupation—that is, the straightjacket
of critique. Again, Said is a case in point.
As the political scientist Joseph Massad
perceptively notes, being a “secular critic”
played a central role in Said’s intellectual
life: “He insisted on being politically godless in an age dominated by the worship
of political deities—the ‘West,’ Soviet
Communism, U.S. imperialism, nationalisms of all varieties, to name the most
prominent” (Massad 2010: 23). And, in
some ways, it meant things Palestinian
as well: “I take criticism so seriously as
to believe that, even in the very midst of
battle in which one is unmistakably on
one side against another, there should
be criticism, because there must be critical consciousness if there are to be issues, problems, values, even lives to be
fought for” (Said 1983: 28). This helps us
to understand his public criticism of the
Palestinian leadership and many Palestinian intellectuals surrounding the Oslo
Accords of 1993-95. Said’s commitment
to justice and Palestinian rights and
self-determination branded the Accords
as an accommodation to power, marking
the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) and the Palestinian Authority
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

(PA) as participants in a one act play with
Israel as its stage director. As far as Said
was concerned, “Capitulation!” was in its
tenth season when he died of leukemia in
2003 (Massad 2010: 24).8
The intellectuals’ homelessness, which
we find instantiated in the likes of Said, is
to be expected, given (1) that even moral
judgments in favor of the dispossessed are
often, if not always, predicated to some
extent on speaking to the truth of empirical claims9 and (2) that no individual (or
group) has a strangle hold on the truth.
In regard to this latter claim, perhaps the
British philosopher J. S. Mill had it right
in his essay On Liberty when he wrote of
one of the advantages to a diversity of
opinion: since the “general or prevailing
opinion on any subject is rarely or never
the whole truth, it is only by the collision
of adverse opinions that the remainder of
the truth has any chance of being supplied” (1962: 180). Or, through another
lens, the adverse opinion (of the weak and
the downtrodden), is rarely or never the

Rory
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For a glimpse of the full force of Said’s critique of Arafat and the PLO, see Said (1996a)
and (2005). A fine example of the depth of
Said’s criticism is the following: “Arafat is finished: why don’t we admit that he can neither
lead, nor plan, nor do anything that makes
any difference except to him and his Oslo cronies who have benefited materially from their
people’s misery? He is the main obstacle to
our people’s future” (Said 2004: 96).
9
Saree Makdisi (2008) notes that following
the Oslo Accords of 1993-95, “Said found
himself battling not only the injustice of Israel’s policies and the historical injustice of
Zionism itself but also the corruption, ignorance, and poor judgment of the Palestinian
leadership” (57).
8

59

The Hyperintellectual in
the Balkans:
Recomposed

60

whole truth on any subject so that a collision with the prevailing opinion is needed
for a more robust speaking to the truth.
This means the opinions and practices of the
weak and downtrodden sometimes yield to
fact and argument, an outcome that the
hyperintellectual is ready to acknowledge.
The synthesis of the hyperintellectual
continues with the second characteristic
alluded to by Paul Ricoeur. For him, the
intellectual is someone who is a political
educator, an individual committed to motivating people through “good counsel” to
become responsible citizens who can work
and live together within a framework of a
democratic economy (1974, 1986, 1992).
I suggest that good counsel is more about
creating people through an acculturation
process than it is about simply motivating
people to behave in certain ways. More
precisely, good counsel can promote “responsible citizens” through building certain kinds of epistemic and political cultures.
The process of making responsible citizens can be understood epistemically
insofar as the hyperintellectual qua educator functions as a role model, setting an
epistemic standard for others to adopt. In
short, the counsel strives to create good
epistemic agents, that is, “persons who
believe propositions because they have
epistemic reasons (which increase the
probability that one’s beliefs are true)...”
(Conces 2009: 24). Just as important,
however, is that the hyperintellectual acquires these reasons through no small
effort of their own. In a way, this effort
reflects what Kant had in mind when he
broached the subject of enlightenment.

Enlightenment is man’s release from
his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is
man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from
another. Self-incurred is this tutelage
when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage [laziness and cowardice] to use it
without direction from another. Sapere
aude! “Have courage to use your own
reason!”—that is the motto of enlightenment (1986: 263).

So the hyperintellectual is intellectually autonomous, rather than conformist;
someone who is not reliant on another
for the “direction and control of...[their]
thinking” (Paul and Elder 2002: 32).10
Such agents not only take epistemic
reasons and autonomy seriously, but they
possess commonplace self-restraints on
reasoning. These restraints include the various regulative ideals or epistemic goods
such as understanding, intelligibility,
and trustworthiness; and the intellectual
virtues such as humility (vs. arrogance),
empathy (vs. narrow-mindedness), and
integrity (vs. hypocrisy). In addition, the
good epistemic agent acknowledges “the
To speak of intellectual autonomy in this
way does not require us to decide whether the
hyperintellectual is either an extreme or weak
epistemic egoist as defined by Zagzebski
(2009: 88), for these two forms of epistemic
egoism include the agent either demanding proof of p that can be determined by the
agent’s own faculties or evidence that the
other person who is providing the evidence is
trustworthy, respectively. In short, “both kinds
of egoist think that the fact that someone else
has a certain belief is never as such a reason for
them to believe it” (88).
10

Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development

moral obligation to care about true belief
itself ” (Conces 2009: 23; Zagzebski 2009:
9-19).
Interesting enough, epistemic concerns have been clearly recognized by a
number of economists, including Adam
Smith’s introduction of the impartial
spectator (1976), Gunnar Myrdal’s discussion of objectivity and bias (1969),
Amartya Sen’s treatment of impartiality,
and Thomas Piketty’s casting of the role
of intellectuals, including social scientists
(2014). At the start of his massive Capital
in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Piketty succinctly notes that the role of intellectuals, including social scientists, is
to “redefine the terms of debate, unmask
certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all positions to constant
critical scrutiny” (3). Surely, what Piketty
and the rest have in mind in some form or
another is good epistemic agency!
Understanding responsible citizenship in epistemic terms makes the social
critic and the educator supportive of one
another because truth is at the heart of
both roles. It is no wonder that the hyperintellectual does not take these roles
to the extreme. On the one hand, the hyperintellectual qua critic does not engage
in fanatical dissent, which is blind, incessant critique of the Other. Such dissent is
the hallmark of those who are intolerant,
self-righteous, overly certain, and zealous.
The hyperintellectual is less vulnerable to
such dissent because the sort of weak reasoning and suspension of commonplace
self-restraints on reasoning are contrary
to the hyperintellectual being a good
epistemic agent. On the other hand, the
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

hyperintellectual qua educator does not
acquiesce to power. Such acquiescence
would mean a transformation of the role
of the intellectual to “one of closing debate, not opening it; of serving power,
not challenging it; of humoring authority,
not speaking truth to it” (Massad 2010:
42)—that is, becoming a mouthpiece of
the decisions, policies, and vision of those
in power. It is precisely because the hyperintellectual is a good epistemic agent
that the commonplace self-restraints on
reasoning are not significantly reduced or
abandoned, allowing the hyperintellectual to educate with truth to power (and to
lack of power). Criticality is not replaced
by loyal obedience. Of course, the intellectual as a good epistemic agent could find
some state policies justifiable, especially if
the state is not criminally totalitarian or
outright fascist. Educating others about
the legitimacy or efficacy of state policy,
for example, need not amount to “cutting
a deal” to make life easier for the intellectual.11 But exhibiting acceptable epistemic agency does require a heightened
sense of scrutiny of policies that are the
products of state, corporate, or other institutions of power. Some believe that a
balance must be struck between the two
extremes. Laying out this balance, Said
writes, that
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the intellectual ought neither to be so
uncontroversial and safe a figure as to
be just a friendly technician nor should
the intellectual try to be a full-time
For a discussion of fanatical reasoning, see
Conces (2009: 34-36).
11
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Cassandra, who was not only righteously unpleasant but also unheard....
But the alternatives are not total quiescence or total rebelliousness (1996:
69).
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But what is the relevant level of description for explaining the actions of an
intellectual? Is it, as Said believes, on the
level of a “friendly technician” and a “fulltime Cassandra,” in which case he believes
there must be a balance, or is it on the level of good epistemic agency developed as
a social critic and educator, in which case
there is no need for a balance but is simply a matter of resisting extremes. What
is at stake is far more nuanced than Said’s
passages indicate.
But promoting this agency is also integral to creating responsible citizens who
can “live and work together,” for surely
the good epistemic agent, more than the
fanatic, is likely to be someone who is
able to meaningfully interact and become
deeply interdependent with a diverse
group of others, especially in deliberative democracies that do not simply have
legitimacy based on the aggregation of
preferences through voting but rather as
a result of authentic deliberation.12 Such
Some may say that much of what I offer is
not very applicable to present-day Palestine
and that Said was right after all: “Better disparity and dislocation than reconciliation under duress of subject and object; better a lucid
exile than sloppy, sentimental homecomings;
better the logic of dissociation than an assembly of compliant dunces” (Said 2000: 17).
Yet creating a citizenry and a community is a
work in progress. Perhaps Palestinian and Israeli Jew do not live on the surface of a shared
12

62

deliberation produces less partisanship,
enhances sympathy with the plight of
others, and increases commitment and
consensus building. It does so by placing
more value on evidence-based reasoning,
agreeing that reasons need to be public
and understandable, and being open to
the possibility of changing one’s mind.
These are the hallmarks of non-fanatical
reasoning.
Good counsel can also promote responsible citizens through the creation
and maintenance of specific types of political culture, including, though not limited to, one that is supportive of a liberal
democracy. Such a culture fosters moral
content that falls under the general heading of liberty, equality, justice, and fraternity. And it is replete with the specifics
of individual rights; equal opportunities;
equal respect for persons; equal liberties
of speech, association, and conscience;
and the rest. So the hyperintellectual can
give good counsel through the integration of such content in his or her analyses
and judgments.
Political culture is far more expansive, however. The American philosopher
Martha C. Nussbaum claims in her book
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for
Justice, “all political principles, the good
as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure their stability over time,
and all decent societies need to guard
public sphere, complete with a lived interconnectivity; maybe it is more like a donut, one
on which being good epistemic agents living
and working together is simply not feasible.
But surely the donut can be traded in for a
sphere, for it is simply an engineering problem.

Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development

against division and hierarchy by cultivating appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love” (2013: 2-3). Not only must
the moral content win the minds of citizens, but their hearts must be won over
by strong emotions which support that
content. Being a proponent of a liberal
society herself, Nussbaum contends that
the political cultivation of emotions has
two distinct tasks: (1) to bolster strong
commitment for national goals, projects,
and visions that are beyond the narrow
agendas of the personal and that “require
effort and sacrifice” and (2) to reduce the
harmful “tendencies to protect the fragile self by denigrating and subordinating
others,” especially when group identity
is involved (2013: 3).13 She argues that
love is fundamental for a decent society
because the emotions that sustain such a
society are rooted in love. One emotion
that is particularly important for this
work is compassion and its connection
with empathy. It is at the core of the inflationary model of morality, which is part
of a framework for situating the hyperintellectual in modern-day civil society
building and democratization, as well as a
catalyst for the creation and maintenance
of a democratic culture.
But nothing in the rendering of the
political educator as one who gives good
counsel through the creation and maintenance of epistemical and political cultures indicates that this role is contrary to
that of the social critic. Nothing that has
been stated so far about good epistemic
I have addressed this concern with the xenophobia and chauvinism of ethnic nationalism in Conces (2005, 2002).
13
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agents, epistemical and political cultures,
and emotions indicates that a judgment
by the hyperintellectual in favor of the
state or an international organization administering a territory would be evidence
that the hyperintellectual is simply an accomplice of that ruling hegemony. On
the contrary, the judgment could simply
comport with the fifth characteristic of
the hyperintellectual—non-partisanship
—which creates the possibility to challenge what some take to be a self-evident
wrong perpetrated by the state or some
other powerful entity. Consequently, the
hyperintellectual does not become a part
of the “dialogue of the deaf,” subservient
to either side’s “vision of history” and
claims of being misunderstood, manipulated, or exploited (see Dragović-Soso
2002: 130-131).
The third characteristic, that of the
person of action, lies at the heart of a
shift that eventually dominated JeanPaul Sartre’s thinking on the intellectual,
a move away from his initial portrayal of
the intellectual as the committed writer
(one who dwells in the realm of thought)
to that of the revolutionary or militant
(one who dwells in the realm of action), a
move that was made final during the late
1960s. Douglas Kellner’s insightful unpublished paper (1975) on the trajectory
of the Sartrean intellectual is most useful
in this regard.14

Rory
J. Conces

One of the best exposes of the shift in Sartre’s thinking on the intellectual can be found
in Douglas Kellner’s unpublished paper “Intellectuals and Revolution: A Study of the
Philosophical-Political Trajectory of JeanPaul Sartre” (1975).
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Kellner, in surveying Sartre’s writings
on the intellectual, takes Sartre’s writings immediately following World War
II and into the 1950s as portraying what
he refers to as the “classical intellectual.”
Early on, beginning with a series of essays in What is Literature? (1947), Sartre
focused on the intellectual as writer, one
who commits literature to the expansion
of freedom (Kellner 1975: 5). As France
became more embroiled in the Algerian
problem, Sartre’s rendering of the intellectual was increasingly framed within
the colonial experience and the function
of the intellectual took on an increasingly moralistic tone, albeit not limited to
denouncing the injustices in Algeria. As
Kellner notes, “the sphere and arena of
the intellectual [for Sartre] is the word:
writing and talking. The function of the
intellectual is critical and negative: to
describe and denounce” (10). The 1950s
also saw Sartre take a Marxist turn in his
philosophy while certain events within
the political realm (the Soviet invasion
of Hungary in 1956) led to his distancing
himself from the USSR and the French
Communist Party. The classical conception of the intellectual continued to hold
sway for Sartre, but this was to end in the
1960s.
Kellner notes that Sartre’s conception
of the intellectual began to change starting with a lecture series that Sartre delivered during a visit to Japan in SeptemberOctober 1966 which were subsequently published under the title “A Plea for
Intellectuals” (1974). At the heart of
this new conception is a contradiction
that emerges in the life of intellectuals

within a class society. On the one hand,
the intellectual is a technician who produces practical knowledge through the
search for universal truth for the good
of all. However, this technician becomes
subservient to the interests of dominant
ideologies, groups, and institutions within a class society. Thus, “a contradiction
emerges between the universality of intellectual labor…and the particularity of
the interests served” (17). The intellectual
realizes this contradiction and becomes
cognizant of functioning as a tool for the
ruling class. With the recognition of further contradictions, the intellectual becomes rebellious and, being seen as such
by the authorities, draws their attention
in order to bring him or her back into the
fold. The intellectual has two ways to respond to the ruling class: conform to it
or refuse to be its agent. It is the latter
response, which amounts to trying to resolve these contradictions, that leads to
the genuine intellectual. However, this requires the intellectual to “leave the realm
of ideas and see that social change can
only come through mass action and that
they themselves must work on the level of
action and events (and not merely ideas)”
(22). In other words, the genuine intellectual investigates the personal and social in
order to bring about change. But if there
is to be change, such as the elimination of
discrimination, the intellectual must not
only modify his or her thinking and the
thinking of others by offering convincing
arguments, but must also modify his or
her sensibility, for discrimination is also
an attitude comprised of a cognitive, affective, and action triad (Sartre 1974:
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249). However, these modifications alone
are not sufficient to eradicate this problem because the intellectual’s most valuable work in challenging a problem like
discrimination occurs on a far different,
though not wholly unrelated, level. Since
discrimination is not simply an idea, but
an idea that is actualized in events that
are dated and localized, the intellectual
must produce concrete events that serve
to reject discrimination at the level of
events (1974: 251). The intellectual needs
“to join [an action]..., to...participate in it
physically...” (1974: 261). The intellectual
must be engaged; hence, the intellectual
is a “person of action”; and, since he or
she is battling the ideas and culture of the
ruling class, the intellectual is also a revolutionary or a militant in the name of the
oppressed. This new revolutionary was
the end point of the trajectory of Sartre’s
thinking about the intellectual which
found its most concise expression in a
1971 interview with the political scientist
John Garassi. For Sartre, “the intellectual
who does all his fighting from an office
is counterrevolutionary today, no matter
what he writes” and that “the intellectual who does not put his body as well as
his mind on the line against the system is
fundamentally supporting the system—
and should be judged accordingly” (Sartre
1971: 117-118).
While in general I agree with Sartre
that the intellectual often needs to act
in ways that are much more risky than
wielding a pen or pounding a keyboard, I
do not agree with him that the intellectual per se must be a revolutionary and that
as a revolutionary he or she must also act
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

in this more expansive way as contrasted with the counterrevolutionary, who
apparently remains indoors at a writing
table or computer and, thus, impotent to
combat the system.15 Although this discourse makes sense in regard to the hypointellectual, it is not applicable to the
hyperintellectual. Indeed, my contention
about the epistemic foundation of the hyperintellectual does not support acts that
are rigidly revolutionary or militant, or, to
put it in slightly different terms, as always
siding with the least favored and most
oppressed of society, and always in a more
risky sort of way. Acts can include writing
or picketing that are not revolutionary
in nature, but rather reactionary, statist,
or simply supportive of the structures of
power and authority that only occasionally oppress. Sartre’s casting the genuine
intellectual as someone engaged in the
fight against the system is overshadowed
by the hyperintellectual’s epistemic character. What is foundational for hyperintellectualism is that it is epistemically improvisational; there is no ideological script
for actions to adhere to, no ideological
patron to satisfy. Being improvisational
amounts to being a non-partisan, which
is the fifth characteristic of the hyperintellectual. The hyperintellectual is not in
lock step with or against the influence of
the powers that be, whether those powers
refer to the state, corporations, or parties.
Such loyalty, the requirement that a per-
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It appears that Sartre was of the view that
not to engage in action only enhances the
possibility that any revolutionary gains will
be lost, thereby justifying the label “counterrevolutionary.”
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son is in favor of this side or that side, for
the left or the right, is what is indicative
of the hypointellectual rather than the hyperintellectual. Even though there being
no privileging of either the revolutionary
or the reactionary as always being a good
moral agent, there is the possibility that
both the revolutionary and the unrevolutionary are intermittently good epistemic
agents. That is to say, they can both be
occasionally good moral and epistemic
agents; neither one being absolutely good
(or, absolutely bad) in either way. And as
far as action goes, what is important is the
breadth of actions that are incorporated
into the regiment of the hyperintellectual.
Even though the power of ideas is formidable, that “all human actions are carried
out and find their meaning and significance in a cultural ambience of ideas...”
(Callicott 1995: 35), the battle against injustice or the defense of truth may require
not only putting “pen to paper,” but also
standing in a picket line for either those
who claim little power and who feel that
their needs are not being met or those
who are in power (perhaps even the state)
because such participation is itself a concrete event in the public domain that is
recordable and which sends a message.
The fourth characteristic is insiderism. Although being an insider may seem
contrary to the social critic as an outsider, Michael Walzer, best known for his
Spheres of Justice, makes it clear that this
need not be so. In a more recent book
The Company of Critics: Social Criticism
and Political Commitment in the Twentieth
Century, Walzer refers to the critic as an
insider insofar as the person exhibits a

certain mindfulness and commitment to
the society in question. The critic is one
“who care[s] about what happens to it
[the society]” (2002: xi). To take a critical stand and a caring attitude toward a
society, however, does not mean that the
critic must meet the demand for objectivity through a “radical detachment, absolute impartiality, or a God’s eye view of
the world...” (2002: xii). On the contrary,
the critic must be “engaged” in the society,
and this engagement comes only from
one’s own subjective situation. As Franz
Rosenzweig makes us clearly aware,
the single condition imposed upon us
by objectivity is that we survey the entire horizon; but we are not obliged
to make this survey from any position
other than the one in which we are, nor
are we obliged to make it from no position at all. Our eyes are, indeed, only
our own eyes; yet it would be folly to
imagine that we must pluck them out
in order to see straight (1961: 179).16

Although this engagement does not
require the critic to reside within the society in question (one can be a critic in exile
or an expatriate critic), it does require a
certain degree of knowledge about that
society. There are many different perspectives and sets of experiences from which
intellectuals voice their criticism. But the
“good” social critic (though not necessarily the successful one) is not just someone
I am struck by how similar this is to Geertz
(1986), when he states “we cannot live other
people’s lives, and it is a piece of bad faith to
try” (373).
16
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who is empirically informed. The intellectual is someone, declares Walzer, to whom
we need to listen, who “touch[es] our
moral nerves…and force[s] us to look at
what we would rather avoid, the wrongness in our own society, in our own lives”
(2002: xiii). The intellectual is in possession of the moral virtues of courage, compassion, and a good eye (2002: xiv-xvii).
Moral courage is important because it
involves the ability to continue criticism
when one’s fellow citizens (even friends)
are silent or complicit. The hyperintellectual practices a form of radical forthrightness. Compassion also has its place
because knowledge of human suffering
is crucial for appropriate criticism.17 And
a good eye is valuable because the critic
must be open to the world in order to be
honest about the presence of oppression,
exploitation, and injustice.
Plus Q-ness:
Being a Non-Partisan is a Bitch
So far the characteristics or threads that
define the diverse set of hypointellectuals
and that serve to define in large measure
the hyperintellectual have been laid out in
such a way that it may give the impression that moving from the most minimal
type of intellectual to the most severe
“Compassion [is] …a state of mind that is
nonviolent, nonharming, and nonaggressive.
It is a mental attitude based on the wish for
others to be free of their suffering and is associated with a sense of commitment, responsibility, and respect towards the other” (The
Dalai Lama and Cutler 1998: 114).
17
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hypointellectual (one whose characteristics are accentuated) to the hyperintellectual comes with relative ease. However,
any hypointellectual who desires to turn
“hyper” faces a set of difficult challenges,
a sort of Scylla and Charybdis that will
serve to deter many an intellectual.
On one side of the narrow straight is
Scylla, the many-headed monster, who is
ready to manhandle all those who stray
too close. Scylla, in this argument, are deficiencies associated with each of the four
characteristics—critical insider, political
educator, person of action, and caring insider. On the other side of the straight,
however, is Charybdis, a whirlpool that
destroys those ships that cannot escape
it. In the present argument, Charybdis
is the danger of partisanship or bias that
gives the other characteristics a distinct
ideological aura, leading the intellectual
to take sides whenever the occasion arises. It is in this sense that the intellectual
has an ideological patron. The resulting
disturbance leads to one ideology replacing another; an epistemical and political
culture limiting who can live and work
together, as well as how liberal a society
can become, the abandonment of any
desire to solve the contradictions in favor of becoming a “hired hand” for those
who rule or command; and a caring for
some within society and not others. It is,
in short, the entrenched exclusivity that
exists today. Not only must the hyperintellectual significantly possess all four
characteristics of the hypointellectual, he
or she must possess a certain degree of
quirkiness (q-ness) vis-á-vis the fifth characteristic, non-partisanship, the one char-
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acteristic that acts as a “glue” (possibly
vaccination) for the rest and that results
in an amalgam (possibly health). This is
the final and most important piece of the
elaboration of the hyperintellectual.
In exploring the meaning of non-partisanship, it is best to first discuss how it
differs from impartiality, which has come
under heavy criticism. Examining both
Iris Marion Young’s 1990 Justice and the
Politics of Difference—a postmodernist critique of impartiality, and Marilyn Friedman’s 1989 “The Impracticality of Impartiality”—an article that is both critical
and revisionary, is helpful in this regard.18
Both Young and Friedman remind us
that impartiality has been treated as an
Friedman, more so than Young, alerts us
to the diversity of terms used to refer to an
“unbiased normative standpoint.” Terms like
‘bias’, which is “the unduly favoring of one
party, person or group of persons when disputes arise or interests compete,” and ‘prejudice’, which “a judgment formed prior to due
consideration” are often used interchangeably
with ‘impartiality’. Friedman combines them
in referring to the sort of “favoritism that is
not based on due consideration, or supported
by good reasons” (1989: 646-647). I will use
the term ‘impartiality’ though the other two
terms will surface later in my discussion of
this topic. It should also be noted that Young’s
postmodernist critique, that highlights the
discarding of difference for unity, draws heavily from Stephen Darwall (1983) and Thomas
Nagel (1986) for her discussion of impartiality found in chapter four entitled “The Ideal of
Impartiality and the Civic Public.” Friedman’s
refers to Darwall and Nagel as well, though it
is more of a conceptual analysis that focuses
on the weaknesses of two theoretical models
of impartial moral thinking—the methods
of universalization and models of social contract—but closes out the article with a recommendation for dealing with bias.
18
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ideal throughout much of modern ethical
theory. The “unbiased standpoint” has even
seeped into everyday moral thinking as
the “privileged standpoint for critically reflecting on normative matters” (Friedman
1989: 645). Yet impartiality is destined to
controversy; Young views it as being extremely problematic, while Friedman finds
impartiality to be elusive.
According to Young, the ideal of impartiality arises in its association with a
paradigm of moral reasoning that situates
the reasoner within a moral point of view
that is both universal and objective (99).
The process by which the theorist or the
agent arrives at this point of view is “by
abstracting from all the particularities of
the circumstances on which moral reason
reflects” (100). It is an attempt to reduce
plurality to unity, denying or repressing
difference, through a threefold abstraction leading the impartial reasoner to be
detached, dispassionate, and a universal
reasoning subject. The impartial reasoner denies the experiential and historical
particularities of a situation, allowing for
the treatment of situations from the same
moral principles. The impartial reasoner
abstracts from feelings and interests that
he or she may have in regard to the situation. Also, the impartial reasoner abstracts
from the partiality of affiliation that is
part of what constitutes concrete subjects,
leading to a point of view that any and
all rational agents can adopt (100). The
result of these abstractions is a point of
view that is devoid of concreteness; it is a
“transcendental ‘view from nowhere’.”
But Young is keen on showing the
problems of impartiality. First, particularity will always be in operation regardless
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of abstraction since the abstraction process generates a dichotomy or an opposition between the impartial and universal
aspects of a moral context and those that
are partial and particular. In addition,
there is a dichotomy between reason and
feelings. Although reason is defined in a
way that calls for their expulsion, feelings
and interests simply do not go away. They
are an ever present source of motivation.
Thus, partiality and impartiality are two
sides of the same coin (97, 103). Second,
impartiality is an impossible ideal because
moral reasoning cannot (and should not)
purge particularities of context and affiliation. As far as Young is concerned, the ideal of impartiality is a fiction: “No one can
adopt a point of view that is completely
impersonal and dispassionate, completely
separated from any particular context and
commitments” (103). And, since all viewpoints are “situated,” they cannot be universal. They are all entrenched in particularity. Third, impartiality has an ideological function (that is, supportive of domination and oppression) insofar as it masks
the ways in which dominant groups claim
universality of their own perspectives and
justify hierarchical decision making (97).
But the ideals of impartiality and nonpartisanship are not one and the same.
Whereas impartiality is a so-called transcendental view, a move away from the
moral agency of concrete human beings in
a world of particularity, non-partisanship
is an acceptance of the concreteness of our
being and the particularity of the world
that we live in, a full acknowledgment
of our perspectivism while disallowing
one or more perspectives from exhibiting some form of favoritism, whether it
be analytically differentiated as a bias or a
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

prejudice.19 Favoritism amounts to partisanship, an attitude that leads a person to
naturally take a side in a conflict from the
very start. Moreover, he or she will view
problem after problem, issue after issue,
in the way that any other socialist, or liberal, or conservative would view problems
and issues.20 So this is what it means to be
a partisan, to be attached to a particular
ideology or group affiliation and an associated cluster of perspectives that biases
judgments one way or another. Being so
attached also means that one can be identified, whether it is a matter of self-identification and/or other-identification, as a
“socialist” or “liberal” or “conservative” or
whatever other kind of hypointellectual.
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A treatment of perspective qua bias is developed within the writings of Gunnar Myrdal
(1968, 1969, 1970). In his strongly worded
attack on the myth of objectivity in research,
Myrdal points to the important role that our
biases play in research: “There is a tendency for
all knowledge, like all ignorance, to deviate from
truth in an opportunistic direction….A first
pre-condition when trying to unfetter our
minds from biases in order to reach a truer
perception of reality is to see clearly the opportunistic interests affecting our search for
truth and to understand how they operate”
(1970: 3-4). Myrdal’s point is a valuable one,
but it is also important to distinguish between
bias qua favoritism and bias qua perspectivism.
20
This echoes Nagel’s work, though Nagel takes it back to the fundamental level of
evidence in his uncovering the lunacy of the
postmodern, relativist project: “The subordination of the intellect to partisan loyalty is
found across the political spectrum, but usually it takes the form of a blind insistence on
the objective truth of certain supporting facts
and refusal to consider evidence to the contrary” (2005: 461).
19
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The non-partisan, on the other hand,
will evaluate each problem or issue so
that what is objectionable and defensible within each opposing camp is given
voice. The hyperintellectual as non-partisan does not enter into the discussion
or the debate biased or prejudiced one
way or another, but open to the possibility of agreeing with one side or another
or neither depending on the outcome of
the analysis. What is important is not
a particular side, but that the debate is
kept alive to the very end, which hopefully gives rise to the more reasonable
position. Young herself allows for the
possibility of the non-partisan given her
contention that the entrenched particularism of human beings does not mean
that we are “only self-regarding, unable
and unwilling to consider other interests
and points of view” (114). There may be
nothing like a universal point of view that
is the same for each and every rational
agent, a Rawlsian-like original position or
a Nagelian-like view from nowhere, but
that does not rule out the possibility that
an intellectual, for example, will consider “other interests or points of view.” In
this regard, “to consider” another point of
view is not the same as “to adopt” another
point of view. It simply means that they
are “sympathetic” or open to evaluating
other points of view without summarily
accepting or dismissing any one of them.21
The feminist political philosopher Susan
Okin (1989), in her attempt to resurrect the
Rawlsian original position as a reasoning process that arrives at the best outcome by taking into account all particular viewpoints in
society, herself seems to reject the “adoption”
paradigm in favor of the “sympathy” paradigm
21
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All but one point of view may survive the
evaluation process, but that occurs only
as a result of the process and not due to
some bias.22
Of course, this view of non-partisanship is not without its difficulties. First,
there is the mechanism by which a person
becomes or remains a non-partisan. How
are perspectives kept at bay from becoming biases or prejudices? In attempting to
answer this question, however, we face a
host of practical problems. For instance,
how do we become cognizant of perspectives as perspectives that bias or prejudice our moral thinking about issues and
problems that we face in life? But enumerating our potentially distorting perspectives, which are themselves dynamic,
is not something that we are in the habit
of doing. Then, again, there is little reason
to catalog the entirety of one’s perspectives (if possible) at any given time. It is
enough to simply be mindful of those
potentially distorting perspectives that
are relevant for the situation in which we
currently find ourselves. Even so, this is
not as easy as one might believe, for as
Friedman notes, “for good psychological
reasons, each person’s unaided thinking
cannot be trusted to discern its own biases. One’s own thinking—explicit and
when she contends that the resurrection is
predicated on the moral reasoner simply being able to be “sympathetic” with other positions and points of view. Young, to my dismay,
fails to distinguish the two paradigms (Young
1990: 105)
22
Amartya Sen (2011) gives us pause to rethink the expectation which many have that
there must always be one view or argument
that wins out over all the others.
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implicit, avowed and tacit—is not fully
transparent to oneself ” (655-656). For
Friedman, then, it is through the assistance of “interpersonal and public dialogue” that biases and prejudices become
recognizable to us.
But even if we personally and interpersonally succeed in listing the relevant
perspectives, there remains a further practical problem—keeping one’s perspectives
at bay until “due diligence” is achieved.
What does it mean to “keep perspectives
at bay” so that they are “disarmed” of their
distorting power? Does it simply mean
saying to oneself, for example, “I will not
make reference to elements of my socialist ideology when working on a particular
problem”? But would that even make a
difference? Twisting Freidman just a bit,
even if ideology or gender, race, religion,
ethnicity, class background, etc., are referred to, this does not mean that ideology and those other particulars will not
“influence” the consideration, thus making it partial rather than impartial. Surely,
to simply say it isn’t so does not mean that
it isn’t so. Freidman with Darwall in mind
is correct about the crux of the problem
when she states that “the problem is that
there is no way to ensure that one’s normative thinking is not being tacitly affected by one’s own subjective particulars
or debarred motivations” [regardless of
them being referred to] (652).23 Indeed,
the consequences are enormous:
Beliefs about the causes of poverty and
about society-wide responsibilities to
Friedman focuses on the “unmentioned”
particularities, but my concern includes those
that are mentioned.
23
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the poor may well reflect the motive
force of one’s own class background.
Beliefs about the legitimacy of subsidized daycare at professional meetings
may reflect the motive force of one’s
parental status. One’s degree of tolerance for sexual and other sorts of social
violence may reflect the motive force
of one’s gender (652-653).
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But even though there is no guarantee
that our normative thinking will not be
distorted in the ways mentioned or yet to
be mentioned, it does not follow that there
is no method for improving our critical
moral thinking through uncovering our
perspectives qua biases. In fact, Friedman
has suggested one: interpersonal and public dialogue. However, I think Friedman
does not fully appreciate the value of her
own method, for it is not simply that “the
beneficiaries, victims, observers, and so
on, of one’s behavior may be better situated than oneself to discern biases hidden
behind one’s articulated moral attitudes,
because they can comprehend those
avowals contextually in the light of ones’
related actions and practices” (656). What
is buried by this discussion of the “observant Other” in this dialogical relationship
is the very act of “calling us out on it,” of
shouting at us in no uncertain terms that
we are biased or prejudiced in this way or
that way, perhaps not so to the Other who
shouts but biased or prejudiced to another
Other who is aware but remains silent or
who is not even aware of our favoritism.
Second, there is the issue of the
self-identification and/or other-identification of an intellectual. The non-partisan is said to take on problems or issues
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on an individual basis, judging each on its
own merits. On one day and concerning
one problem, the hyperintellectual judges
in such a way that he or she “appears” as
a liberal to some onlookers. The next day
and concerning another problem, that
same hyperintellectual may judge in a way
that he or she “appears” to be a conservative to the very same onlookers. But what
happens if a hyperintellectual just happens to judge each and every day in a way
that gives the appearance of a socialist?
Nothing noted thus far rules out such a
possibility, albeit slim as it may be. Do we
then brand that hyperintellectual a socialist? If so, then the distinction between the
socialist as ideologue and the hyperintellectual as socialist may have vanished. If
this distinction remains viable, then how
is it to be made? If there are no practical
guidelines by which these differentiations
can be made with confidence and accuracy, then the efficacy of this conception of
a non-partisan intellectual is placed into
question. This, in turn, jeopardizes the
concept of the hyperintellectual. These
are vexing issues. Without a solution to
the twin concerns of non-partisanship
and identification, the prospects do not
look good for a coherent concept of hyperintellectual. However, I have elected
to simply mention these issues, delaying
a more rigorous analysis for another time,
or to be carried out by someone else.
Pause
To be honest, some may find this description of the intellectual to be contestable.
They may even doubt whether the in-
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tellectual holds as a distinction from the
non-intellectual. But even if there is a
deep affinity between many or most intellectuals, intellectuals are not as monolithic a group as one might think. There
are many kinds of intellectual to be considered—people who are less oppositional and educate in ways that are less
promoting of good epistemic agency and
democratic culture, or do not have much
interest in moral virtues, but who do engage in considerable action.
We are left, thus, with a group of spectra. Think of each of the four characteristic spectrums as ordered arrangements
of a particular characteristic with an assigned value on the interval [0, 1] indicating the extent to which the characteristic
is exhibited. A value of 1 indicates that
the characteristic is fully exhibited, while
a value of 0 indicates the characteristic is
not exhibited whatsoever. This might suggest that there are only 14 combinations
and, so, only 14 kinds of hypointellectual.
But there are values in between 0 and 1 for
each spectrum, thereby greatly increasing
the kinds of hypointellectual. Recalling
the previously noted set of characteristics—less oppositional, less promotional
of epistemic agency and democratic culture, less interested in moral virtues, but
action oriented—we might simply assign the following values [.6, .5, .6, .9] to
make up its unique spectral set. What this
“spectral description” affords us is a much
more encompassing definition that is not
confined to the traditional labels of leftist,
or, neo-conservative. In fact, I am not sure
how these traditional categories would
be understood in terms of spectral sets.

Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development

However, what is most important about
these sets is that higher numerical values
get us closer to the sort of intellectual—
the hyperintellectual—that is needed to
promote a culture of dialogue, tolerance,
moderation, and the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts. Accordingly,
someone is a hyperintellectual to the
extent to which he or she reflects those
characteristics that promote such a culture in a non-partisan manner, which is
the principal distinguishing characteristic
between the hyperintellectual and the hypointellectual.
It is also important to keep in mind
that hyperintellectuals operate within
the space of civil society, a space that is
crucial for geographical territories that
are in need of democratization (Bremer
and McConnell 2006; Chandler 2000;
Diamond 1994, 2005; Fine 1996; Held
1995; Seligman 1992). Two post-conflict
territories in need of democratization are
Bosnia and Kosovo, places in which the
International Community’s (IC) reconstruction efforts continue to include the
creation of civil societies and the democracies that such societies help to sustain.
Although these efforts look upon political institutions like “free, fair, and frequent
elections” and “freedom of expression” as
crucial for democracy (Dahl 2005), these
institutions are only as effective as the culture that “holds” them together (Gibson
2004) or the web that suspends them
(Geertz 1973). Integral to this support
is civil society, for it is within this space
that culture shapes how people behave
politically. As Bruce Parrot reminds us,
“It stands to reason that political culture
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

affects whether citizens choose to support
moderate or extreme political movements
and parties, and whether they choose to
engage in democratic or anti-democratic forms of political participation” (1997:
21-22). This is no less true for Bosnia
and Kosovo, where a culture of dialogue,
tolerance, moderation, and the mutually
beneficial resolution of conflicts is crucial
for democracy building. So, I now turn to
a consideration of civil society and how
the hyperintellectual can act to enhance
understanding and reduce divisiveness
between rivals.
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The Hyperintellectual’s Task:
Building a Climate of Understanding

The Public Sphere and Civil Society
In establishing the relationship between
the hyperintellectual and civil society, it
is important to first understand the idea
of public sphere as explored by Jürgen
Habermas in “Offentlichkeit” (1989) and
the idea of civil society as formulated by
Michael Walzer in “The Idea of Civil
Society” (1991). Habermas characterized
the public sphere as
a domain of our social life in which
such a thing as public opinion can be
formed. Access to the public sphere is
open in principle to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted
in every conversation in which private
persons come together to form a public….Citizens act as a public when
they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coer-

73

The Hyperintellectual in
the Balkans:
Recomposed

cion….We speak of a political public
sphere….when the public discussions
concern objects connected with the
practice of the state (1989: 231).

The public sphere appears when people come to together to discuss public
concerns, with the “political” variant being
created when those individuals discuss
matters of politics. In other words, the political sphere is created with the “dialogical publicity” of one’s politics. It is never a
matter of remaining “private,” but always
a matter of being within a discursive space.
But as Noëlle McAfee notes in Habermas, Kristeva and Citizenship, the public
sphere is neither the lived, communicative space of the home or work place,
nor is it a part of the official structure
and mechanism of governance (2000:
81-101). Instead, the public sphere is a
social space in which people can freely
come together to engage in meaningful
dialogue about issues that concern them
(Habermas 1996: 360-361). It is that part
of the spatial network which exists between the private sphere and the state.
What then of the relationship between the public sphere and civil society?
Walzer points out, “‘civil society’ name[s]
the space of uncoerced human association
and also the set of relational networks—
formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space”
(2002: 293). Civil society is a more encompassing space because it includes the
entire array of public spheres. Although
civil society involves a communicative encounter, the emphasis here is on civil society as an “associational life.” But of what
exactly are the networks composed? For
74

Walzer, they include the “unions, churches, political parties and movements, cooperatives, neighborhoods, schools of thought, societies for promoting or preventing this and that” (293). Student and trade unions, churches, and the like, however, do not fully describe civil society’s
networks, for these networks also include
associations such as garden and bowling
clubs, interest groups, and coffee klatches (McAfee 2000: 83). There are also the
press, professional organizations, women’s organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These associations and networks of common interest
or concern (which in many cases have
little, if any, regard for politics) occasionally allow people to leave the confines of
their homes and workplaces to enter into
a more expansive common life, whereby
civility can be furthered and the good life
made pronounced.
But the means by which people today
operate within civil society have changed
radically with the arrival of the Internet.
Not only has the Internet made the more
traditional “brick and mortar” venues and
institutions easier to manage and more
reachable, but the Internet has allowed
new tools like email, blogs, and open letters to help create powerful networks of
communicative encounters and human
association that are incredibly more expansive, less centralized, and more spontaneous than past networks. There is no
question the situation has been decidedly
improved by technological innovation.
But what about the relationship between civil society and democracy? The
belief that civil society is not only compatible with or promotional of democ-
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racy, but that a strong civil society is an
essential building block of democracy is
widely held and often expressed. This is
particularly evident from the coverage and
analysis of the Colour Revolutions (RoseGeorgia 2003; Orange-Ukraine 20042005; Blue-Kuwait 2005); the Yugoslav
5 October Revolution (2000 Bulldozer
Revolution); and the more recent Spring
Revolutions (Arab 2010-; Turkey 2013-;
Ukraine [Euromaiden] 2013-; Venezuela
2014-; and Bosnia and Herzegovina
2014). In many of these, particularly the
Color Revolutions, NGOs played an important role in the advocacy of democracy.
However, we would be misleading ourselves in denying that civil society “can
be racist, exclusionary, backward and recalcitrant” (McAfee 2000: 84). Bosnia
and Kosovo, being settings of deeplyentrenched conflicts, are still dealing with
the divisiveness of xenophobia and chauvinism related to ethnic nationalism. In
those cases, associational life may have
little to do with civility, at least civility as it
pertains to interethnic group interaction.
Harold Saunder’s distinction between
“civil society” and “democratic civil society” is illuminating and gives us an ideal
to work towards. Whereas the former is
simply that complex network of associations and relationships that citizens generate to deal with the problems they face
throughout life, the latter reflects a “qualitative” change in the sort of network that
the person is a part of, i.e., “the ways citizens relate within … [groups] and how
these groups relate to others—[through]
deliberation, dialogue, collaboration rather than authoritarian or adversarial interactions” (2005: 58). The importance of the
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

former over the later cannot be understated for democracy. This has been put so
nicely by David Cooper in his 2007 essay,
“Is Civic Discourse Still Alive?” that it is
worth repeating at length:
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Simply put, civic discourse is that mode
of collective democratic counsel. It is
the way citizens think about, form, and
articulate their relations with public issues. Civic discourse happens through
speech acts that span all sorts of rhetorical forms and practices, from diatribe and polemic to argument, debate,
deliberation, and, not the least as we
shall see, ordinary face-to-face conversation and personal narrative. I like to
think of civic discourse as the rhetorical framework of democracy. It has to
be strong enough to support and preserve the durable footings of democratic dissent—assembly, free speech,
petitions of grievance. Its joints need
to be flexible enough to accommodate
changing climates, new voices, and
new modes of communication such
as digital environments and global
information networks. And yet the
framework needs enough human scale
and respect for vernacular to sustain
democracy as local, intimate, and interpersonal (2014: 115).

Admittedly, the hypointellectual and
the hyperintellectual each play a role within a democratic civil society, an environment rich in civil discourse, but their roles
are not the same because of the presence
or absence of partisanship. Returning to
Cooper, we can see how those roles play
out:
75

The public sphere—the marketplace
of civic discourses in a democracy—is
neither a boxing ring nor a place of
perfect harmony or dependable consensus-building. Instead, public culture is pulled between these extremes,
while language practices tend to obey
the historical, political, and social forces that set public culture in motion. At
any one moment in time it may seem as
though civic discourse ebbs strongly—
pulled by the tidal action, for example,
of a nation’s recovery from the shared
traumas of war, economic depression,
natural disaster, and dislocation—or
wanes precipitously, following the active fault lines of national divisions,
ideological inertia, partisan gridlock,
and exhausted social capital. [This is
a]...view of civic discourse that oscillates between these extremes, one that
both encourages consensus-building
and deliberative action and tolerates
conflict, argument, and sharp elbows
(117-118).
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Perhaps the roles are captured in the
following way: the hypointellectual tends
to “work against” the Other, whereas the
hyperintellectual tends to “work with” the
Other.
What we have here, then, is the propagation of a democratic culture that can
help to ward off an overpowering state
and constrain the more authoritarian elements within society.24 The groups that
contribute to this culture often do so as
“the vanguard of political reform and dePaul Bremer refers to trade unions, political
parties, and professional organizations as the
“social ‘shock absorbers’” that “help cushion
the individual from an overpowering government” (2006: 12).
24

76

mands for governmental transparency”
as noted by Benazir Bhutto in her book
Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the
West (2008: 291). She goes on to write:
They are the internal election monitors. They stand up against violations
of human rights. They work with international groups that promote democracy to guarantee a fair political
process but not a guaranteed political
outcome (291).

But to acknowledge that civil society
is Janus-faced, as Saunders leads us to believe, is to recognize its fragility. Thinkers
and doers of all kinds, including the ethnic
nationalist variety, often become self-proclaimed intellectuals who proudly show
their xenophobia and chauvinism in the
hope of increasing their ranks and power
within an increasingly fragmented society. Thus, they operate within civil society
in ways that are antithetical to democratic
culture. But no matter how precarious the
situation, the ideal is for civil society to
incorporate an increasingly democratic
culture of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and mutually beneficial resolution
of conflicts. Clearly, the political public
sphere can play a dominant role in promoting a democratic culture; moreover, I
submit that the hyperintellectual can play
a dominant role within this sphere.
Hyperintellectualism in Bosnian
Democratization and Peace-Building
How might the hyperintellectual express
his or her presence in developing a democratic culture within the political sphere of
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civil society? The hyperintellectual might
be useful in enhancing understanding
between rivals which could lead to a reduction in the divisiveness between them.
Remember that the hyperintellectual is
a social critic, a political educator, a person of action, and a caring insider bundled in a non-partisan way. It is by being
a social critic as expressed in an oppositionality to any single ideology, a political
educator as shown by a commitment to
motivate people through good counsel
to become responsible citizens who can
live and work together, a person of action
expressed in an engagement that brings
about concrete change in society, and a
person who cares about the target society
that the hyperintellectual can help to promote and sustain dialogue, understanding, tolerance, moderation, and mutually
beneficial resolution of conflicts as the
core elements of a democratic culture. By
“showing how engagement is done,” the
hyperintellectual helps to develop a democratic political culture.
But how might this engagement play
out in civil society? What exactly is the
hyperintellectual up against? For quite
some time this engagement meant the
hyperintellectual had to hone in on the
relationship between the International
Community and the ethnic nationalists
(whether in or out of government).Given
that the IC’s peace-building efforts were
the mechanism through which progress
could be anticipated, getting the IC and
nationalists of all kinds to work together was essential for success. However, the
IC’s administration of Bosnia is seen at
times to be contrary to the interests of
the various ethnic communities, with the
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

potential of producing more and more divisiveness. But if the hyperintellectual can
successfully argue for the moral legitimacy of these efforts, these efforts may be
one less source of divisiveness. (This also
applies to arguing against the moral legitimacy of those efforts in favor of some
alternative. Whichever way, the key is to
reach some sort of persuasive equilibrium
that leads to increased welfare).
But this is not an easy task. After
all, the war in Bosnia unleashed a toxic
combination of ideology, national interests, power, and violence that led to the
deaths of many tens of thousands of people and diminished welfare of those who
survived. Given the nexus of the conflict,
the antagonists themselves were unable to
bring about an end to the conflict, causing the IC to eventually intervene, resulting in a “sign or else” agreement (the
Dayton Peace Agreement) that included
long-term international involvement that
was non-negotiable. The IC was doing its
best to influence the decision-making of
the belligerents to accept an agreement
that would turn Bosnia into an international protectorate for the foreseeable future.25 It could be said that from the very
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This is not a case of libertarian paternalism
as developed by Sunstein and Thaler (2014).
Whereas in some loose way the influence
brought to bear on the belligerents by the IC
could be construed as its paternalistic aspect
insofar as there is an attempt “to steer people’s
choices in directions that will improve the
chooser’s own welfare,” there is not much that
smacks of being libertarian because it lacks
the freedom to “opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do so” (1161-1162).
For more on libertarian paternalism, see Sunstein (2014) and Thaler and Sunstein (2003)
and (2009).
25
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beginning the IC’s efforts at improving
the welfare of those affected through democratization and peace-building were
framed in terms of the diminution of state
sovereignty and autonomy (Chandler
2000: 34-35).
Indeed, the obstructionism inherent in
ethnic nationalist politics was an impetus
for drafting the DPA in a way that mandated the IC taking on the role of manager
of the Bosnian state. To be more specific,
the UN High Representatives, being the
final authorities in Bosnia regarding the
interpretation and implementation of Article V of Annex 10 (Agreement of Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement or DPA) to the General Framework
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and being the recipients of the Bonn
Powers of 1997, for years resorted to using a heavy-handed approach in countering the negative effects this ideology
had on the civil implementation of the
DPA. Sometimes the intervention has
been directed at the state level, such as
when High Representative Wolfgang
Petritsch removed Ante Jelavić from his
position in the three-member Presidency
of BiH in March 2001 on the grounds
that Jelavić was seriously obstructing the
implementation of the DPA.26 A similar
situation occurred in March 2005 when
High Representative Paddy Ashdown
Jelavić’s obstructionist behavior began with
an illegal political demonstration on Election
Day in November 2000 and a provocative
speech in 28 February 2001 in Busovača, and
it culminated on 3 March 2001 with a gathering in Mostar that was the occasion for an
unconstitutional initiative meant to establish
illegal parallel institutions.
26
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dismissed Dragan Čović from the Presidency of BiH.
At other times the intervention has
been directed at the municipal level. The
January 2004 decree made by Ashdown
is a case in point. After years of eroding
the civic and multi-ethnic character of
the city of Mostar, evidenced by the existence of costly parallel municipal structures and services—over US$19 million
annually (Alic 2004), and the unwillingness of members of the two ethnic-based
ruling parties in Mostar, the Bosniac
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and
the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH
(HDZ BiH), to engage earnestly in municipal governance, Ashdown, in the exercise of the powers vested in the position of High Representative, presented
the people of Mostar with the statute
by which their city would be governed.27
Being an advocate of the multiethnic
structure of Bosnia and recognizing that
the unification of the city of Mostar was
one of the preconditions for Bosnia to
sign the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA), a precursor to EU
membership, Ashdown made the need to
break the stalemate by imposing measures
an imperative “even if...[those measures]
are sometimes a little antidemocratic”
(Ashdown 2004). Not only would the
statute reflect the “unity theme” by creating a single, multiethnic administration,
but it would provide a streamline electoral process that would at the same time
attempt to take care of the needs of the
See Paddy Ashdown’s 28 January 2004
Speech and his 28 January 2004 “Decision
Enacting the Statute of the City of Mostar.”
Both available from World Wide Web (http://
www.ohr.int).
27
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constituent peoples and others. Instead
of there being 194 elected officials, there
would only be 35, and they would be elected through a process by which 3 would
be sent from each of the 6 newly created
electoral units and the remaining council
members would be elected in a city-wide
vote. In addition, there would be provisions for establishing minimum numbers
of council members for each constituent
people and the others, as well as setting
a maximum number of council members
for each of the constituent peoples at 15,
making sure that “no constituent people
can be dominated by another” (Ashdown
2004). This unyielding and uncompromising measure and those that preceded
it were understood by many in the IC
as justified because they were in keeping
with the wide mandate of the DPA and
its numerous annexes and extensions.
Now, it so happens that in June 2011
and January 2012, the BiH Constitutional
Court ruled that the electoral system of
the Mostar statute was both unconstitutional and discriminatory.28 Apparently,
the rulings by the Constitutional Court
did not strike down the statute, but only
the electoral process. Unfortunately for the
people of Mostar, lawmakers in Bosnia’s
House of Representatives failed to adopt
changes to the electoral law for Mostar
It was unconstitutional insofar as there
was a tremendous discrepancy in the number
of votes that were required to elect council
members from each city unit and that the voters in the central zone were only able to elect
council members from the citywide list of
candidates. It was found to be discriminatory
insofar as the voters from the central zone
were not provided with equal voting rights
(see Ashdown 2004).
28
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on 14 May 2014, which once again took
Mostar out of the local election cycle in
October 2014 ( Jukic 2014).
In passing, however, it is worth mentioning that the High Representative and
the OHR appear to have taken a slightly less hands-on approach to the political quagmire in Bosnia over the past few
years. Although the Prime Minister of
the Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik
campaigned during the 2010 Presidential
election on a platform of veiled secession
and engineered the crisis over the referendum that would have challenged the
legitimacy of the national judicial system and the powers vested in the HR,
Dodik was never sacked. On the contrary, he is currently the President of the
Republika Srpska. Yet until the High Representative’s mandate is ended and the
conditions for closure of the OHR met,
nationalists of all persuasions will continue to find at least some of the practices
of these foreign overseers to be unacceptable, thus creating a project for the hyperintellectual.
But there is more. Another project, as
crucial as the first, concerns the demand
by many Bosnians for accountability and
dignity of their own government officials
that started in earnest with the Babylution
of 2013 but that kicked into high gear
with the Spring 2014 protests and subsequent plena (McRobie 2014).29 More and
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The Great Flood of 2014 that struck portions of the Balkans could be the pretext for
those in power to take back control from the
plena and those who oppose the state and
the IC. This refers not only to Naomi Klein’s
(2007) “disaster capitalism,” but also to what I
call “disaster governance.”
29

79

The Hyperintellectual in
the Balkans:
Recomposed

80

more Bosnians have grown tired of the
legislative stalemate that has paralyzed
the country and that has led to direct
militancy. This includes many people who
were previously indifferent to activism.
They are fed up with the incompetence,
greed, and corruption of their politicians
who are increasingly seen as caretakers of
a peace agreement run amok. Moreover,
the electorate is becoming wiser to the
willful blindness—the intentional placement into a position of being unaware of
the facts in order to avoid civil or criminal liability—of those who are in power,
whether they be government officials or
corporate managers. Facing loss of power
it is no wonder some of these individuals preach deafness to the human suffering around them. The causative nexus
may not be completely understood, but it
is reasonable to think that much of this
growing unrest is not ideologically driven,
ethnic nationalist or otherwise. The battle
between ideologues is not a precursor for
the hyperintellectuals’ involvement; the
hyperintellectual can just as well foster
understanding between citizen groups,
government officials, and corporate leaders so as to make any debate more meaningful and efficacious.
But it is to the tension between the
democratization and peace-building efforts of the IC and the nationalists that
we turn to as a point of entry for the hyperintellectual, one that is crafted within
a theoretical framework that is broadly
construed in terms of paternalism and
libertarianism. At the center of the debate
over the moral legitimacy of democratization and peace-building in Bosnia are

the crucial but rarely posed questions of
whether such efforts are, on the one hand,
instances of self-protection or paternalism, or, on the other hand, straightforward means to greater degrees of autonomy (not exactly libertarianism). If the
IC is to successfully guide the rebuilding
of Bosnia by gaining the cooperation of
the Bosnians themselves, they must do
more than give their policies and decrees
a purely legalistic justification vis-á-vis
the DPA. Those of the IC must examine
the moral justification of their work and
ask how their efforts are judged in terms
of protectionism, paternalism, and autonomy-enhancing.30 A sketch of how the
hyperintellectual might proceed would be
useful.
Unlike motorcycle helmets and retirement programs or default rules and the
notion of voluntariness that are the standard fare in the debate over paternalism
in America (see Dworkin 1983; Sunstein
and Thaler 2003; Salvat 2008), the policies of the High Representative and the
OHR as juxtaposed to recalcitrant ethnic
nationalist segments of Bosnian society are only adequately framed within a
broader context of self-protectionism, paternalism, and autonomy enhancement.
In order to meaningfully contribute within this context, the hyperintellectual must
first define ‘self-protectionism’ and ‘paternalism’, and then decide which of the
IC’s measures fall under each. In searching for a starting point, Gerald Dworkin’s
“Paternalism,” is an excellent choice. We
Autonomy is the capacity to be a self-legislating agent who takes responsibility for his
or her actions.
30
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get a sense of what self-protection means
in the following passage by Mill that is
much quoted by Dworkin:
The sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to
others (Dworkin 1983: 19; Mill 1962:
135).

Mill ends this passage with a statement that is not quoted by Dworkin: “His
own good, either physical or moral, is not
sufficient warrant” (135). The sort of conduct that Mill has in mind is not purely
self-regarding or personal; it is otherregarding. And given that it is important
to protect the integrity of the individual
so that he or she can enjoy being an autonomous agent, self-protection is sufficient to warrant intervention in the lives
of others.
How does this conduct relate to Bosnia? Suppose nationalist elites were paralyzing municipal institutions of the city
of Mostar through political feuding and
genuine incompetence, thereby hampering the distribution of the much needed
services of water, electricity, law enforcement, and trash collection to the city’s
residents. If going without these goods
and services meant that people were
harmed, and if Ashdown’s 2004 decree
were intended to prevent Bosnian nationalist elites from causing further harm,
then there would be at least a prima faGlobal Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

cie warrant for such a decree. And if being harmed by doing without goods and
services diminishes one’s autonomy, then
the cessation of harm can only be autonomy-enhancing. It is a prima facie warrant, however, because a clear burden of
proof must be placed on the authorities to
demonstrate the exact nature of the harm
being done to the residents of Mostar and
how the High Representative’s measures
will prevent further harm and enhance
autonomy. The burden of proof is needed not only because any interference with
people’s liberty of action in such dramatic
ways needs to be justified, but also because it can reasonably be assumed that
each measure taken by the IC is likely to
be viewed as an attempt to undermine nationalist interests, in which case providing
a justification would preempt nationalist
rhetoric. What makes the hyperintellectual’s argument for the warrant, as well as
its being a prima facie warrant, especially
important is, in part, that it is non-partisan: it gives voice to both sides and presents the hyperintellectual as “having no
dog in the fight.” And without a dog in
the fight, the hyperintellectual acquires a
certain degree of acceptance by both the
nationalist and the representative of the
International Community.
But might some of these same measures have a paternalistic dimension as
well? Perhaps, but only after confusing
paternalism for something else. Suppose
we follow Dworkin’s definition of paternalism, which is “the interference with a
person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare,
good, happiness, needs, interests, or val-
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ues of the person being coerced” (1983:
20). If we focus on the rationale for implementing more coercive peace-building
measures like restricting nationalist elites
from political participation and eliminating parallel institutions, we can acknowledge that the reasons originally adduced
to support these measures do in fact reflect “the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interests, or values” of Bosnians. But these
measures, as in the case of Mostar, are a
tough response to actions that are harming residents of that city. So to say that
the IC’s efforts are paternalistic suggests
paternalism to be something it is not, i.e.,
wholly concerned with other-regarding
conduct. As I read Dworkin, however, paternalism is concerned with self-regarding conduct or matters that are “exclusive”
to the person. But the feuding and incompetence in Mostar is none other than
other-regarding conduct. Consequently,
the discussion need go no further: the sort
of peace-building measures that we have
in mind are all other-regarding and so fall
outside paternalism. The most that can be
given is a protectionist justification. Yet
ending this discussion may be premature.
Although the IC may construe these
more coercive peace-building measures as
imposing restrictions on other-regarding
conduct, thereby allowing the IC to protect people from certain kinds of harm,
nationalists may still disagree with this
view. In fact, ethnic nationalists of whatever kind may not only claim that no
harm is being done to members of other
groups, but may also claim that the conduct in which they are engaged is selfregarding insofar as it allows members of

their own ethnic group to behave in ways
that they deem important and that reflect
their conception of who they are as individuals possessing a certain ethnic identity. Thus, some of those peace-building
measures that are said to be protectionist are now construed by the nationalist
as paternalistic and, therefore, unjustified.
Here, too, the hyperintellectual must
place a heavy and clear burden of proof
on nationalists and members of the IC
to demonstrate the presence or absence
of risk of harm, because the argument for
paternalism turns on there being neither
harm nor the likelihood of harm to others. If no harm is being done, then the
conduct that is being addressed by interventionism must be other-regarding,
thereby making the claim of paternalism
groundless and eliminating any need for
the IC to argue for justifiable paternalism.
It may seem that proving or disproving harm or the risk of harm is a relatively
simple task. However, harm is understood
in different ways. A young man, for example, who is a Bosnian Croat nationalist
living in Mostar, may look at the parallel institutions and acknowledge that the
feuding and incompetence have led to
some “inconvenience” to the residents of
west Mostar, yet still believe this a better arrangement and a step toward acquiring more autonomy and the eventual
creation of a Croat state within Bosnia.
Is this inconvenience the sort of harm
that other-regarding conduct and protectionism require? Or is this arrangement
a matter of self-regarding conduct that
is for the person’s “own good” (or, now
it seems, group-regarding conduct), and
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thus off limits to intervention? On the
other hand, the High Representative may
claim that this is exactly what is meant
by harm and that there is much more to
come, e.g., the possibility of renewed violence because of the divisiveness caused
by ethnic nationalism.
The situation is obviously more complicated than this. Take, for example, that
same Bosnian Croat nationalist living
in west Mostar. Suppose he possesses a
strong sense of solidarity with his ethnic community and believes that what
is good for the Croats of Mostar is also
good for him. He has been made aware of
the evils of ethnic nationalism but continues to remain true to his beliefs by repeatedly voting for and giving consent to
his nationalist leaders. Is this a case of not
sufficiently understanding or correctly appreciating the dangers that may await the
nationalist? If so, do we judge the young
man’s voting behavior to be unreasonable
though not irrational?31 And if the High
Representative responds by saying that
most reasonable people do not wish disruptions in their utilities and being victimized by violent assault, thus presuming that this individual did not wish to
run those risks either, then what do the
nationalist and High Representative have
to talk about? (see Feinberg 2003). Not
much, though the hyperintellectual can
do much to further this conversation.
However, the hyperintellectual is also
characterized as someone who is an insider, who cares about the society in question,
See Salvat (2003: 12) for Feinberg’s distinction between reasonable and rational.
31
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a caring that is predicated on the possession of the moral virtues of courage, compassion, and a good eye. Of these, compassion is particularly interesting given
its role in the inflationary model of morality, a model that can support democracy building by enlarging moral space
through the utilization of empathy (and
hospitality). Even though people tend
to pride themselves on being tolerant of
others, democratization may be better
served in the long run through empathy
and hospitality.32 In what follows, I shall
discuss this model of morality so that the
last connection can be made between the
hyperintellectual and democratization.
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The Hyperintellectual’s Task:
Enlarging Moral Space

The Inflationary Model of Morality
Since the beginning of Western moral
philosophy some twenty-five hundred
years ago in Greece, there has been a debate concerning the relation between reason and emotion. If we understand moral
Martin Marty points out that “one of the
problems with tolerance within pluralism is
that those who tolerate often have the power
or the will to remake “the other” into some
manageable image. Hospitality permits—indeed, it insists on—regarding the other as
being really different” (2005: 124). Surely,
we want to move beyond mere tolerance.
Whereas hospitality is a movement towards
recognizing and welcoming me for who I am,
tolerance suggests that those who occupy a
privileged position get to decide whether to
put up with me.
32
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philosophy as a reasoned analysis of the
nature of morality and all that it requires
of us, then we find throughout Plato’s dialogues what amounts to the beginning
of a very long debate over “how we ought
to live.” It is reason rather than emotion
that prevails in our deliberations. When
it comes to searching for a “universal
and objective” foundation of morality, it
is again reason that is found to be the
worthy candidate. Kant is the epitome of
this reason-bound view of morality. He
argued that it is not because we possess
the capacity for feeling that we are moral
agents, but because we have the capacity
for reason. At the heart of morality is respect for others, which unfolds from the
supreme moral principle: The Categorical
Imperative. If we are to respect other persons, as stated in The Formula of the End
of Itself, it is because we ought to “act in
such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end” (Kant
1967: 91).
But should respect for others be our
sole interest? What about concern for
others, i.e., care shown towards the Other’s
autonomy? As Arne Johan Vetlesen
points out in his Perception, Empathy, and
Judgment, Kant has no place for concern
within morality because concern turns
on our capacity for feeling (1994: 1).
But perhaps Vetlesen is correct to question the opposition between respect and
concern. Could someone have respect for
others, i.e., take into account the integrity
of those other persons—their inviolable
right to decide what is in their best inter-

ests—and not “show any concern for the
weal and woe of those others” (1994: 2)?
Similarly, does it even make sense to talk
of showing concern for someone while
not also having respect for that person?
Not at all, for autonomy and integrity
seem to work together. Clearly, there is a
place for concern in moral performance.
Of course, reason is important in morality, particularly when the very possibility of rational discourse concerning moral
judgments is cast aside by those who have
adopted a faith-driven morality. I believe
the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett is
correct when he writes that
anybody who professes that a particular point of moral conviction is not
discussable, not debatable, not negotiable, simply because it is the word
of God, or because the Bible says so,
or because “that is what all Muslims...
believe, and I am a Muslim...” should
be seen to be making it impossible for
the rest of us to take their views seriously, excusing themselves from the
moral conversation, inadvertently acknowledging that their own views are
not conscientiously maintained and
deserve no further hearing (2006: B8).

He goes on to explain:
Suppose you believe that stem-cell research is wrong because God has told
you so. Even if you are right—that is,
even if God does exist and has, personally, told you that stem-cell research is
wrong—you cannot reasonably expect
others who do not share your faith or
experience to accept that as a reason.
The fact that your faith is so strong
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that you cannot do otherwise just
shows...that you are disabled for moral persuasion....And if you reply that
you can, but you won’t consider reasons for and against your conviction,...
you avow your willful refusal to abide
by the minimal conditions of rational
discussion (2006: B8).

Therefore, there is something to the
primacy traditionally given to reason.
And it is understandable why many have
taken the standard model to be an acceptable alternative to faith-driven morality,
for we are not talking about matters of
taste but moral concerns that require rational justification.
Even so, perhaps we need a more “holistic” account of morality—i.e., an inflationary model—that includes, but is not
limited to, reason’s role in making moral
judgments through the use of principles
and norms, in order to more adequately
capture the moral predicament of persons who are endowed with both emotional and intellectual faculties. Indeed,
we must explain how we become “attentive” to such a predicament.33 Perception,
Empathy, and Judgment is very helpful in
this regard. Vetlesen “retrieves” the notion
of moral perception and the importance
of emotion, particularly empathy, for this
perception which he cites as the first stage
of moral performance.
Exploring moral performance in this
Even Nussbaum goes so far as to acknowledge that moral principles do not apply themselves to situations; we also require perceptions of the salient features of the situation in
which we find ourselves (2012: 143).
33
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way offers a more adequate account of
morality, for we realize that the emotional
faculty of empathy is our principal mode
of access to the moral domain, which is
showing concern and having respect for
others. Moreover, in recognizing the importance of empathy for moral perception and thus for moral performance,
Vetlesen’s inflationary model provides us
with the theoretical basis needed to understand how the hyperintellectual can
promote the formation of a democratic
culture by expanding the moral space of
ethnic nationalists.
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The Inflationary Model,
the Hyperintellectual,
and Democratization in the Balkans
What, then, are the relevant aspects of
the inflationary model for demonstrating
the other way in which the hyperintellectual can contribute to democratization?
The notion of moral performance is an
overarching one. It includes, but is not
limited to, the more often talked about
concept of moral agency.34 Agency refers
to the capacity to make moral judgments
and be motivated to act in certain ways.
In short, it offers an explanation of how
moral considerations are action-guiding.
But a moral theory that adequately attends to the scope of moral performance
must include not only judgment and action, but also moral predicament. This is
because a predicament invokes judgment
See Arpaly (2003) and Korsgaard (2009)
for discussions of moral agency.
34
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and action. So regardless of whether two
well-informed, rational individuals who
use the same moral theory make similar
moral judgments and act in similar ways,
it is crucial that the two individuals first
“attend” to the objects of moral judgments. How do we come in contact with
the “stuff ” of moral judgments? Vetlesen’s
answer is simple:

the circumstance and to see oneself
as addressed by it, and thus to be susceptible to the way a situation affects
the weal and woe of others, in short,
to identify a situation as carrying moral significance in the first place—all of
this is required in order to enter the
domain of the moral, and none of it
would come about without the basic
emotional faculty of empathy (4).

Moral perception provides and shapes
the setting for moral judgment and
moral action. Moral judgment is concerned with the cognitive grasp, assessment, and weighing of the weal
and woe, of the well-being, interests,
and rights of all the parties affected by
a situation…In passing judgment on
how best to act considering the viewpoints of all concerned..., I will need
norms and principles to guide me in
my deliberations. But my cognitiveintellectual knowledge in this field…
comes to naught and remains impotent if I am not sensitive to, if I do
not “see”..., the situation at hand as a
morally relevant one....The sequence
of moral performance is set in motion
by an act of moral perception. Moral
perception takes place prior to moral
judgment and provides the basis for its
exercise (4-5).

In further characterizing empathy,
Vetlesen adds the following:

What allows us to “see” the situation
as a morally relevant one? Vetlesen writes:
We experience the objects of moral judgments through emotion….
Emotions anchor us to the particular
moral circumstance, to the aspect of
a situation that addresses us immediately, to the here and now. To “see”
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It is by virtue of this faculty that I can
put myself in the place of the other by
way of a feeling-into and feeling-with.
Empathy allows me to develop an
appreciation of how the other experiences his or her situation; empathy
facilitates the first reaching out toward
and gaining access to the other’s experience, but empathy does not… mean
that I myself come to feel what the
other feels. I do not have to feel the
other’s feeling in order to grasp, and
thereupon be able to judge in light of,
how the other experiences the situation he or she is in (8).

Given that moral perception is what
“initiates” moral performance, a person’s
inattentiveness or indifference—lack of
empathy—to the moral circumstances of
a situation, will have devastating results
for passing judgments. Perhaps this is
less of a problem for those who reside in
situations of relative tranquility, for there
will be frequent personal interactions that
are “felt” to be positive. At some point
the basic emotional faculty of empathy
is triggered. But consider those situations
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that are less than tranquil. Given the hatred and anger that often overwhelm the
empathic response of those who espouse
ethnic nationalism, nationalists may become “combative” and stricken with a
“malevolent” form of inattentiveness. It is
not simply a “lack” of empathy, but rather a set of contrary emotions that inhibit
empathy. In the case of “benign” inattentiveness or indifference, the Other has little, if any, moral significance. In the case
of combativeness, however, the situation is
much worse, for it is likely that some harm
will be done to the Other.35 The quantity and quality of felt interactions will be
different. The possibility of respect and
concern toward the Other at this point
ceases; increasing the weal is not an option, but increasing the woe is, and this
situation is contrary to empathy. In such
a hostile situation, moral perception must
be “jump-started” by the reinvigoration
of empathy (or attentiveness), thereby allowing one to once again recognize the
Other’s moral significance and well-being.
But what exactly is to be reinvigorated? Unlike gathering evidence and drawing inferences about someone else’s situation or placing oneself in a similar situation as another in order to experience as
best as possible what it feels like to be in
that other person’s predicament, empathy
(or “participatory imagination”) “requires
some type of distinction between self and
Granted, the harm created by indifference is
potentially greater than that caused by hatred,
primarily because of its indiscriminateness
(Vetlesen 1994: 252-253), but hatred has a
certain directness to its harm that indifference
does not possess.
35
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other, and a type of imaginative displacement” (Nussbaum 2013: 146). Here again,
not all imaginative displacements (forms
of perspective taking) are the same; they
are not interchangeable. Results of empirical psychological research have indicated that there are two distinct forms
of perspective taking, imagine other and
imagine self, each evoking different emotional effects as well as different motivations (Batson, Early, and Salvarani 1997).
On the one hand, imagining how another
feels (imagine other), especially if they are
“vivid” imaginings, produces an increase
in empathic emotions (like sympathy and
compassion), reflecting an other-oriented emotional response along with an altruistic motivation.36 On the other hand,
imagining one’s own feelings if one were in
the situation of the other produces empathic emotions as well as personal distress, reflecting a self-oriented aversive
emotional response along with egoistic
motivation (Batson 1991, 2011). And so
the work done by empathy as it pertains
to moral perception and moral judgment
is closely associated with empathetic
emotions and not just the imaginings. It
is because of these emotions that the connection between imagine other and moral
perception and judgment is solidified. The
best way to promote moral performance
is through the imaginative displacement
of focusing on another’s feelings rather
than one’s own.
Interestingly enough, the role that
these empathic emotions play, whether
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See Nussbaum’s splendid job in laying out
a nuanced discussion of compassion (2013:
137-160, 314-377).
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they are directly the result of an imagining, goes well beyond placing us in a position to make a formal moral judgment.
Long-winded moral judgments are important, but what is also of considerable
importance is the work of empathic emotions in intimately connecting us with
the predicaments of others, which could
trigger a pre-judgment act on our part to
alleviate suffering and misery. Although
moral judgments do a lot of work for us
insofar as they are “normally multifaceted
involving intrinsic motivation, belief, and
emotion” (Campbell 2007: 348), empathetic emotions by themselves can quickly channel us to act in certain ways.
Some would have us believe that empathy and its associated emotions are not
hard to come by, that we continuously
find ourselves in situations that allow us
to learn how to broaden our attention to
include others, to combat the constant
temptation of narcissism.37 Vetlesen is one
of those who believes that empathy (attentiveness) can be learned. Supposedly, I
can learn to see that a situation addresses me in a certain way, and that positions
me to take notice of the Other’s moral
circumstance, to have empathetic emotions, and to have concern for the Other
(though Bateson and Nussbaum contend
that imagine other is the sort of empathy that needs to be experienced, and, no
doubt, learned). This takes place in everyday life, in what Tom Kitwood calls:
our countless small and unreflective
actions towards each other, and the
Nussbaum makes the problem of narcissism
an important one in her work. See Nussbaum
(2012: 20-58; 2013: 161-198).
37
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patterns of living and relating which
every human being gradually creates.
It is here that we are systematically rejected or discounted, accepted or rejected, enhanced or diminished in our
personal being (1990: 149).

It is in everyday life that we create
moral space, space within which we are
a part of a web of “person-enhancing” relationships characterized by dignity and
respect. However, there seems to be a hollowness to this proposal. Given that everyday life is full of both acceptance and
rejection, enhancement and diminishment, how is empathy to be learned? And
how is it to be learned in the more stressful conditions of combativeness, such as
those fostered by ethnic nationalists? If
people are continually rejected and have
their personal being diminished, it is not
likely that they will learn the attentiveness
needed to feel empathy. Combativeness
may prevail with its emotions of anger,
envy, shame, and fear, thereby preventing
a “healthy” emotional response and, thus,
the debacle of moral performance.
Again, this is especially true of societies in which ethnic nationalism is a principal component of peoples’ identity and
a cause of much conflict. In fact, the moral space in these situations could, at best,
be “compressed,” and, at worst, “closed.”38
It should be no surprise that compresVetlesen notes that Nazi ideology encouraged the closing of not only the public space
within Germany, but also the moral space,
which “assumed the form of a suppression
of the emotional capacities in each of them”
(1994: 9).
38
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sion and closure are possibilities given the
Othering that is invoked by the ontological-psychological-ethical triad of an ideology like ethnic nationalism. Ethnicity is
the ontological category whose relevance
is exaggerated, making it dominate in so
many situations and contexts; persons are
pigeonholed and labeled according to an
ethnic identity. Identifying and labeling
people is important for the ethnic nationalist. Of course, people in every society
choose labels that parcel out group identities to individuals around them, thereby
causing a certain degree of divisiveness
and disharmony within their communities. But some identities are a bit more
troublesome than others. This is especially true when identities like ethnicity and
religion become internalized within competing ideologies that have been linked
to past violence.39 In this regard, ethnic
nationalism begins to rear its ugly head.
But this ontology does not sit idle,
disconnected from the rest of the person’s
lived experience. It may be behind the
“Gaze turned Glare” that a young Bosniac
woman experiences as she walks past
This work will not do justice to the importance of personal identity for people in the
Balkans and elsewhere. Someone might infer
from my work on this topic that I have inherited the binary and oppositional view of ethnicities, that all conflict is reducible to Serb
vs. Bosniac, Bosniac vs. Croat, and so forth.
That is not the case. The human diversity that
is found within the Balkans and elsewhere,
for all intents and purposes, seems almost
infinite. Not only are there a multitude of
combinations of characteristics, but the creation of relationships through interaction and
interdependence leads to endless novelty, and
much of this is extremely important to people.
39
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a group of Serb men drinking coffee at
Kafé Bar Davidoff in Srebrenica, a glare
which reflects a xenophobic psychology,
a fear or suspicion of the ethnic Other.
Granted, fear can be useful in allowing us
to survive dangerous situations (including the fear that is evoked when coming
face-to-face with signs like “Mines!” or
“Falling Rocks”). Some fears are natural
and self-focusing, while others are more
or less taught and are Other-directed,
such as those associated with the aforementioned signs, and others that are associated with groups, including ethnic
groups. Fear and suspicion can displace
any concern or sympathy for the ethnic
Other.40 Mistrust can be overwhelming. It short-circuits, at least temporarily, how we see another person as being
fully equal in human dignity and worth,
and thus deserving of our respect. It denies any real opportunity for a “personenhancing” relationship. Even though the
respected Other possesses worth that is
not contingent on our own valuation, the
fear that displaces is ours regardless of its
being warranted or not. The compression
or closure of moral space, space within
which dignity is recognized and respect
given, has begun.
Apart from the ontology and psychology of ethnic nationalism, there is its morality, which is also part of the compression/closure of moral space. In this case,
a chauvinistic morality takes one’s own
ethnic group to be morally superior to the
other groups, which once again contrib-
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utes to the “hollowing out” of the Other’s
human dignity and, thus, respect that he
or she should be given. Some individuals may be morally superior to others in
terms of their deeds and intentions, but
that is a far cry from this moral extensionism that characterizes ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalists fashion history,
from actual events and lived history to
remembered history and the narrative of
a people, by embedding and protecting
one’s own ethnic group with the moral
high ground and by projecting onto one’s
ethnic competitors qua enemies the everlasting negativity of chosen traumas.
The web of history provides identity with
some of its most enduring elements, giving enemies varying degrees of realism, is
generically noted by the Canadian philosopher Trudy Govier:
They are real, because they really do
exist in the objective world of events.
Yet at the same time, these enemies
are constructed and imaginary, because
they are in so many respects the projections of interpretations and fantasies (2002: 151).

This same idea is set so powerfully, yet
so cynically within the Balkan context by
Michael Ignatieff when he writes that
truth is related to identity. What you
believe to be true depends, in some
measure, on who you believe yourself to
be. And who you believe yourself to be
is mostly defined in terms of who you
are not. To be a Serb is first and foremost not to be a Croat or a Muslim. If
a Serb is someone who believes Croats
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have a historical tendency towards fascism and a Croat is someone who believes Serbs have a penchant for genocide, then to discard these myths is to
give up a defining element of their own
identities (1996: 114).

I say cynically because Ignatieff apparently believes there is “less to truth than
meets the eye,” that one’s ethnic nationalist identity “in some measure” trumps
what it takes to be a good epistemic agent.
This simplistic thinking comes perilously
close to providing an epistemological
foundation for the ancient hatreds thesis
that was prevalent in some circles during
the war in Bosnia. It would imply that the
ethnic nationalist is stuck in the groove of
fanatical reasoning, thus eliminating the
nationalist from being an agent for positive social change. Although Bosnia today
is not a hotbed of progressivism, it is not
what it was in 1995. For that matter, it is
not what it was in 2012. Numbers of ordinary citizens have joined local plena in
order to participate in meaningful political discourse. Such citizen engagement is
surely having some moderating influence
on Bosnian identity politics. Yet xenophobic psychology and chauvinistic morality prevails in Bosnia. And the results
are not surprising. When group identities
are formed to secure communities from
their competitors, the formation of this
communal cohesiveness often creates, for
example, disdain for the ethnicity and religion of the Other. It is this disdain that
is exhibited in xenophobic psychology
and chauvinistic morality.
But the question remains: how do we
expand or open moral space that will even-
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tually allow for moral perception or for
seeing the morally relevant circumstances
of peoples’ situations? In an earlier work, I
emphasized that practical measures such
as intercultural education, storytelling,
and moral imagination have been used to
expand the moral circle (or moral space),
thereby “allowing them [people of different cultures] to experience fellow-feeling (or empathy) with the other, and to
act in a more compassionate and civically
responsible way toward them” (Conces
2005: 166). Indeed, NGOs such as the
network of Nansen Dialogue Centers
have been successful at bringing together
different peoples in order to deconstruct
stereotypes and to enhance understanding
between them. Their investment in civil society building can generally be construed in terms of offering safe space for
the re-establishment of interpersonal relationships. Although these practical measures remain useful as devices to rekindle
empathy, it now seems clear that their use
and viability are predicated on people’s
willingness to interact in close proximity,
whether this is completely self-induced or
partly brought about—through incentives
and/or coercion—by the government, the
International Community, or a NGO.
Close Proximity
However, before a person can exhibit a
willingness to interact with the Other in
close proximity, which ideally would include a face-to-face encounter, he or she
must be able to do so. Of course, one’s
ability may be hampered due to a bodiGlobal Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

ly limitation (e.g., being a paraplegic), a
psychological limitation (e.g., being an
agoraphobic), or a social limitation (e.g.,
being threatened by members of one’s
own group). However, there are other
constraints, some of which deal with the
physicality of places, that is to say, localities that have acquired meaning and
value, such as the urban centers within
which people live, work, and visit (Tuan
1977). The constraints that come to mind
are the result of urban design/architecture and the placement of certain kinds
of evocative objects.
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Urban Design and Architecture
Urban design and architecture does not
hold sway in every city and to the same
degree. While some cities are the result
of years of haphazard construction, others
have at least some elements of planning
and purpose no matter how misbegotten.
In Political Emotions, Martha Nussbaum
provides insightful treatments of these
topics, noting that cities and buildings
are more than just masses of steel and
concrete; they have much to do with
how people live their lives, whether they
are “inside” or “outside” the cities and its
buildings. Nussbaum writes in Political
Emotions:
Cities bring people together from different ethnic, racial, economic, and religious backgrounds. Entrenched suspicions often divide them, and these
suspicions can be either diminished
or augmented by the layout of urban
space. Urban architecture creates ways
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of living, sometimes fostering friendship, sometimes reinforcing fear. There
are always grounds for fear in cities:
crime, the volatility of employment,
the diversity of groups and languages.
But architecture can do a great deal
to exacerbate fear into open hostility
or to assuage it, encouraging problem
solving in a spirit of fellowship (328).

Her treatment of New Delhi, India
and the Hyde Park neighborhood in
which the University of Chicago resides
go far in illustrating her points, precisely
the sort of features that cities should not
have if they are to be lenses for building
humane relationships and communities.
New Delhi (not the old Delhi) is the
sort of city ill-suited for human habitation. As Nussbaum writes: “New Delhi
seems like a place that is all about plan
and not at all about people, a place where
people, apart from the very affluent, have
a hard time having a daily life. No place to
walk to the market, to chat, to run into people
of all trades, castes, and classes [my italics]”
(329). Indeed, thanks to the British, a
thriving interactive Hindu and Muslim
urban community became fear ridden
and fractured, the antithesis of fellowship
that has yet to be reversed.
Nussbaum’s rendering of the University
of Chicago in Hyde Park ends on a much
more positive note. The founders of the
university might have started with a socially innocuous architectural plan to create “an inward-looking scholarly community” (333), separated from its surround
environs in both mind and body, but that
plan eventually exposed the same fear and
fracture along race and class lines, epito92

mized by the Gothic style buildings with
their courtyards and the grassy Midway
Plaisance separating what was once the
boundary between the university and the
majority African American Woodlawn
neighborhood to the south. The university’s isolation was furthered by the maze
of one-way streets and dead ends and
occasional fence, some of which “stood
as a symbol of hostility and an inwardlooking mentality—not malevolent, as
were the British in Delhi, but disdainful
toward the neighborhoods in a culpably
obtuse manner” (335).
As far as this part of Chicago is concerned, a remarkable turnaround has
occurred over the past twenty years. The
university administration now thinks of
the university “as a partner of the neighborhoods, pursuing interaction and associated living, not to mention the mutual
advantage of safety” (336). Indications of
this shift include its operation of charter
schools in Hyde Park, new construction
of university facilities in other parts of
Hyde Park and in Woodlawn (including an arts center) as part of a revival of
that neighborhood, university police patrols in Woodlawn, and the revamping
of the Midway as a safe point of interaction between the different communities. Although there remains much work
to do, there has been significant progress
towards openness and inclusivity, cooperation and partnership, and fellowship.
Such changes are the result of civic design, the design of cities and towns with
the goal of creating persons who are more
inclined to work towards civic improvement. These efforts have decidedly ad-
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dressed the proximity issue and improved
the chances for meaningful interaction
between Others.
Enclaves and Evocative Objects
Perhaps the starkest examples of localities
in which members of different groups are
not in close proximity, thereby making it
exceeding difficult to interact with one
another even if there were a desire to do
so, are the ethnic enclaves found in the
Balkans. I have written elsewhere about
these enclaves and the role that evocative
objects play in establishing and maintaining (as well as reducing and eliminating)
these monoethnic communities, but let
me iterate a few key points set within the
context of Bosnia and Kosovo (Conces
2013abcd).
Multiethnic societies are those that
not only exhibit pluralism of ethnic peoples, but those peoples are in a dialogical
(or multilogical) relationship. There is no
such thing as a heterogeneous non-interactive multiethnic society. Interaction and
integration are important aspects of the
multiethnic society. Those societies that
possess pluralism, although short on interaction and integration, are more aptly
referred to as being plural monoethnic
composed of ethnic enclaves.
It is within these areas of high concentrations of more or less monoethnic
communities that we find displays of
evocative objects that are infused with
meaning, thereby offering understanding and stirring emotions within persons,
prompting them to act in fairly predictable and well-defined ways. These objects
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

that are tied to particular ethnic nationalist ideas and passions, when placed in
the home, are fairly innocuous. It is unlikely that they will offend or provoke
outrage in onlookers, since the onlookers
are either their owners or like-minded
family and friends who have accepted an
invitation to enter the home. They know
full well what to expect. It is when these
objects pass into public space, viewed by
more and more people that problems begin to arise. The space into which they
enter becomes increasingly more public
as the objects move farther from the interior of one’s home: from being hung from
a wall in one’s bedroom to being draped
over a window shutter, and then beyond
to the car that is plastered with decals
and driven around town, to the façade of
government buildings, to city squares, to
billboards on hilltops. It is as a result of
this outward projection that these objects
form parts of cityscapes; cognitively, emotionally, and conatively informing people
in different ways, acceptably for some and
unacceptably for others.
For instance, members of a dominant
ethnic group may see a particular array of
objects as infused with meaning that harkens back to an ethnic-paramilitary group
that was instrumental in the creation of a
new state that is largely ruled by the dominant ethnic group itself, thus empowering those objects to stir pride in members
of that same ethnic community. However,
the ethnic group that had the territory
wrestled from them and that are now just
another minority may gaze at these same
objects and infuse them with meaning of
a past defeat with all its atrocities, stirring
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in them seething hatred and desire for
retribution. Clearly, these evocative objects serve as boundary markers, as clear
indicators of domains of ethnic dwelling.
Members of the various ethnic groups
know full well where they are. Ethnic
enclaves exhibit what is called an ethnic
manifold, the defining feature of which
is that any public position within the enclave would look and feel like a place of a
particular ethnic community. This is because the evocative objects found in that
enclave would be of one “ethnic” kind and
would inform members of that particular
ethnicity in ways unique to them.
These objects are much more, however. They are instrumental in creating and
sustaining the enclaves themselves. They
do this because evocative objects are both
centripetal and centrifugal in their affect.
Take the example above. On the one hand,
the objects of the dominant group in that
place encourage others of that group to
come together. These objects are centripetal for them; they make members of the
dominant group feel welcomed in that
place and help to build cohesion of that
ethnic group. On the other hand, these
same objects are centrifugal for members
of the once powerful ethnic minority.
These objects discourage them from being in that place, from interacting and establishing new relationships with the new
dominant group. A particular message is
sent to the minority: “You are not welcome! You are not one of us!”. Of course,
the landscape would be very different in a
place dominated by a minority-majority
population because the centripetal and
centrifugal outcomes would be reversed.

More insidious for both parties, however, is that by not having set foot in a
place that place becomes a “pure idea” for
them, a place that someone else has told
them about. And so it is an “idea” that
can be easily manipulated by each other’s
local leaders, including politicians, members of the Fourth Estate, educators, and
hypointellectuals. These persons of influence can exploit ignorance, uncertainty,
and fear to promote the xenophobia and
chauvinism of their respective ethnic nationalisms. Ethnicity or blood trump the
fact that they share the same geography
and, more importantly, that they are citizens of the same country.
Such outcomes become more significant when we realize that these evocative
objects function not only to claim public
space and make a place home, but they
also make group identity more visible, particularly ethnic national identity, which in
turn claims political power, control, and
agency. Where individuals have made
this group identity their dominant public
identity, the perceived need for boundaries and control, both materially and
symbolically, becomes great. Moreover,
when the situation is one in which a once
strong ethnic minority and a weak ethnic
majority have traded places of power and
governance, objects that are ethnically nationalized become just another means by
which the political struggle remains alive.
And it remains alive especially for those
leaders who want to take advantage of a
“captive audience” to solidify their political power and to increase divisiveness and
uncertainty among their community.
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The Case of Bosnia and Kosovo
Before we begin to connect enclave living and evocative objects/architecture
with democracy building and the extent
to which the hyperintellectual can even
make a difference, we need to be clear
about what sorts of objects and architecture are at work in the Balkans, beginning
with Bosnia and ending with Kosovo.
Although it all depends on where you
are in Bosnia, one is usually not very far
from objects and architecture that bear
the mark of ethnic nationalism. Perhaps
flags are one of the more common objects that invoke both positive and negative feelings in some of its citizens and
visitors. Whether it is a time of celebration or a time of protest, flags are often
used to make a statement and to create a
boundary. On the night of July 21, 2008,
the night that Radovan Karadžić, former
President of Republika Srpska, was arrested in Belgrade, hundreds of people in
cars and on foot converged at the Eternal
Flame (Vječna vatra), located at the intersection of Marshall Tito Street and
Ferhadija, the main pedestrian street in
Sarajevo. It was here that some Bosniacs
waved the flags of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1992-98), the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1992-95), and Turkey. Photos taken of
the early 2014 protests that turned violent in Tuzla and that spread to other cities in Bosnia also show the use of
flags, including the flag of the Republic
of Bosnia. More troublesome uses of
flags can be found in the “divided” city of
Mostar, where Croat nationalists regularGlobal Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

ly display the flag of Croatia, as well as
the Vatican flag.
Of course, flags are not the only objects that invoke nationalist sentiments.
For example, there is the Mostar Derby,
the football match between Mostar’s intercity teams—FK Velež Mostar and
HŠK Zrinjski Mostar—that is usually
populated with fascist salutes, Swastikas,
and Ustashi symbols. Fascist graffiti is
also found throughout the city. It is quite
common to find a U with a cross in it,
the sign of the Ustashi. Monuments are
often targeted by these graffiti “artists,”
including the Monument to the Victims
of Fascist Terror on which was painted
various slogans (such as “Smrt Turcima”
[“Death to the Turks”]). Clearly, the
monument itself has become a battleground for nationalists.41 Of course, evocative objects come in all sizes, some being
quite large. The 33m tall cross that was
erected on Hum Hill high above Mostar,
visible from both Muslim and Christian
quarters is a case in point. Then again an
object can be physically altered in ways
that make the re-appropriation by one
group against another more indelible.
Such an alteration and re-appropriation
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Bosnia’s monuments have this in common with the monuments surrounding the
Spanish Holocaust. It is almost as if modern
Bosnia and modern Spain are in competition with each other to show how their own
battle over memory has been made indelible.
Yet Bosnia has nothing that is comparable to
Valle de los Caídos (The Valley of the Fallen),
a place where people go to pay homage to
their heroes, including Franco, whose crypt is
located in the valley. See Treglown (2014) and
Preston (2012).
41
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took place in January 2014 in the city of
Visegrad, the site of one of the worst war
atrocities perpetrated by Serb paramilitaries on the Bosniac people during the
conflict. In this case, Bosnian Serb authorities removed the word ‘genocide’ from a
memorial plaque in the Straziste Muslim
cemetery. With a grinder in hand, a
worker, backed by a cadre of police officers, removed each letter, one by one,
from the stone face of the memorial. (Not
surprisingly, family members of the victims re-appropriated the memorial by using red lipstick and re-writing the word
‘genocide’ on its stone face). Other examples include the road signs that have the
Cyrillic text blacked out.
Kosovo is no different from Bosnia in
this regard. Indeed, there is a preponderance of public objects in Kosovo’s cities
that carry different nationalist ideas and
passions. Take, for example, the capital
city of Prishtina. It becomes apparent
after an hour long car ride through the
city centre (‘qendra’) and the districts of
Velania, Ulpiana, and Dardania that the
flag most displayed by its Albanian residents is the double-headed eagle of its
southern neighbor Albania. And whenever there is a perceived challenge to
Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially when Serbia is involved,
you can be sure that the Albanian flag will
be in mass, as was the case during the June
2013 protest after Kosovo’s parliament
approved an EU-brokered agreement on
normalizing relations with neighboring
Serbia. Of course, segments of the population can rally to give its support as well,
even with the blue Kosovo flag in hand.

This was the case during the same month
when residents of Prizren gathered to
support Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan. Among the flags of Turkey, Albania, and Bosnia was the flag of
Kosovo, with its six white stars symbolizing its major ethnic groups.
This preponderance is confirmed when
buildings in the capital are examined. Take, for example, the Sports Complex in
the central part of the city. The east end
of the building faces the Newborn monument, which marks the Declaration of
Independence of Kosovo. On the same
end are an Albanian flag and a large photo of Adem Jashari, an architect of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who
was killed in 1998. The photo shows Jashari dressed in full combat regalia. The
international airport southwest of the
capital is named in his honor, as well. But
the use of the Albanian flag to claim public space is also found within government
buildings, such as in the office of the
Ministry of Diaspora.
The Albanians in Kosovo are not the
only ones displaying evocative objects that
anchor their particular nationalist narratives. Granted, there are not many objects of Serbian nationalism in Prishtina
itself (the unfinished Christ the Savior
Cathedral at the university is the most obvious), but crossing the Mitrovica Bridge
over the River Ibar brings one face-toface with an array of objects that serve
the Serb nationalist cause in their enclave
of north Kosovska Mitrovica. Both state
and civil flags of Serbia are commonly
displayed. They can be seen hanging from
light poles and university buildings, as
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well as on a hilltop billboard. And it is
not uncommon to find a photo of someone like Slobodan Milošević displayed
in the business district. In addition, the
Serbian dinar is used as currency and the
music of the Serbian singer Ceca, known
for her turbo folk, a blend of nationalist
folk and techno music, can often be heard
emanating from homes and cafes. The atmosphere is one of being in Serbia and
not Kosovo.
Whether it be a flag like Albania’s
double-headed eagle or Serbia’s tricolour, or a photo like that of Jashari atop
a Sports Complex or a calendar photo of
Milošević hanging on a bakery wall, these
objects are clear indicators of domains of
ethnic dwelling. They reflect the boundaries that describe the fragmented nature
of Kosovo society.
Democracy and Deliberative Democracy

It must not be forgotten, however, that
this newly formed state was forged from
oppression and violence, in part between
peoples of different ethnic groups. It is
one thing to have democratic legitimacy
based on the aggregation of preferences
that occurs in voting, it is an entirely different matter to have that same legitimacy be the result of authentic deliberation.
Perhaps the latter is especially important
for Kosovo, a country fragmented into
ethnic enclaves and whose Albanian electorate continues to create an inequity in
political power. This asymmetrical power
structure raises some doubt to the legitimacy of the democracy itself. This doubt
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

is furthered by the presence of enclaves
because enclaves are not only crucibles
within which ethnic identities become
dominant for individuals, but they are
also breeding grounds for competing ethnic nationalist ideologies.
The ontological-psychological-ethical
triad of an ideology like ethnic nationalism is destructive to a stable and harmonious peace and a well-functioning democracy. The overbearing ethnic categories
and the accompanying xenophobia and
chauvinism are the culprits. Given that
peace, harmony, and democracy are predicated on a continuing exchange of ideas,
the fact that enclaves push different ethnic peoples farther and farther apart leads
to a short-circuiting of this exchange and
produces increasing amounts of uncertainty and mistrust. Enclaves are even
more troublesome, since empathy and associated emotions (e.g., compassion and
sympathy) allow a deep appreciation of
how the Others experience their lives. If
the Other is out of sight and out of mind,
then it will be difficult to empathize with
that person who you already dislike.
But to bring about a stable and harmonious peace, and something resembling a
deliberative democracy, requires that ideas
are more than just exchanged. They are
part of the process of reconciliation, the
development of a mutual, conciliatory accommodation between “formerly” antagonistic groups. Given that reconciliation
requires interpersonal forgiveness, which
entails the recognition of a moral judgment followed by a letting go instead of
seeking revenge, reasoning and the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning be-
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come crucial. And not, to be sure, the sort
of weak reasoning (and lack of self-restraints) of the fanatic, which leads to the
fanatic’s self-righteousness, intolerance,
extreme certainty, credulity, and zealousness.
For a democratic decision to acquire
a certain degree of legitimacy, it must be
the result of authentic deliberation. Such
deliberation produces less partisanship,
more sympathy with the plight of others,
and increases commitment and consensus
building. It does so by placing more value on evidence-based reasoning, agreeing
that reasons need to be public and understandable, and being open to the possibility of changing one’s mind. These are the
hallmarks of non-fanatical reasoning.
Deliberative Democracy
and Civic Design in Kosovo
Unfortunately, little of this will occur in
Kosovo unless there is reason-giving and
emotionally situated dialogue that cuts
across enclaves. In a sense, that would
amount to the core activity of deliberative
democracy running rampant. An effective way for this to take place is through
people having face-to-face contact with
others so that their worlds collide. So the
more a society is composed of discrete
ethnic groups, some of which have a long
history of antagonism with one another,
the more there is a need for integration. It
is through integration and the demise of
ethnic enclaves that Kosovo will become
a multiethnic society.
A multiethnic Kosovo, however, cannot simply be wished into existence. And
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enclaves will not suddenly disappear because of the deal that was struck between
Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013. A multiethnic society will unfold through the
creation of a collaborative environment,
one that is in large measure inclusive, integrated and interactive, peaceful, and respectful of difference rather than simply
tolerant of it. How is this to be done?
It is in part accomplished through civic design, the design of cities and towns
with the goal of creating persons who are
more inclined to work towards civic improvement. In this case it includes a reduction or elimination of public evocative
objects that are likely to be divisive along
ethnic lines. Part of this divisiveness is
created through the memories that are reawakened from the sight of these objects.
The Albanian flags displayed on buildings
and from cars throughout Prishtina and
Serbian flags found on hilltops and light
poles in north Kosovska Mitrovica are
such objects. Dealing with them would
go some way to making these places
more hospitable to members of locally
non-dominant ethnic groups.42 Indirectly,
it would be a way to tinker with people’s
memories and narratives. The hope is that
I have written elsewhere that a legal approach that relies on drafting laws to deal
with evocative objects that are overly provocative might be both unrealistic and unacceptable in Kosovo. A better approach would be to
“promote reason-giving and emotionally situated (read empathetic) dialogue to create the
self-imposition of standards that would censure those who display such objects in order
to create ethnic enclaves. Surely, that would
be legal and should be acceptable to most”
(Conces 2013d: 13).
42
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at some point changing the physical landscape will allow more people to dwell in
the same neighborhoods, feeling at home
with one another in much deeper ways
than could have been ever realistically
hoped for by Albanians, Serbs, and others when Kosovo became independent in
2008.
Hospitality and the Hyperintellectual
So I return to the question, how is this
participatory attitude (or attentiveness) to
be “triggered” so that intercultural education, storytelling, and moral imagination
can stir up empathic responses in people
who are able to be in close proximity if
they so desire? Or, how is attentiveness to
be triggered so that the programs undertaken by the Nansen Dialogue Centres
stir up the empathic responses of its
participants? The American theologian
Martin Marty, in reference to “collisions
of faiths,” provides us with a clue when
he writes that the first address to collisions between “strangers” should be “a
call that at least one party begin to effect
change by risking [my italics] hospitality
toward the other” (2005: 1). It amounts
to receiving the Other, someone who may
be an acquaintance or a friend. However,
in the most challenging situations, it
means receiving a stranger, one who may
be disliked or even hated. This occurs to
some degree when the Nansen Dialogue
Centres invite persons to participate in
their programs, but more so when those
same individuals apply what they have
learned in their own communities. It
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

is when they stray from the protective
workshop and offer hospitality to others that they face the difficult challenge
of re-establishing relationships with their
neighbors.
Whether it is friend or foe, there is
always difference that erupts as Others
who come face-to-face, not as if there
were one person looking “into” a mirror
and seeing himself or herself, but rather
as two persons looking at each other
through a glass window pane. No matter how “hospitable” the host becomes
(no matter how dialogical they become),
there will always be a space of Others
(since dialogue presupposes difference or
nonidentity [do not think of the more
expansive ‘différance’ of the philosopher
Jacques Derrida 1973]).
Hospitality begins with a perceived
“need” to effect change in the world, not
any sort of change, but positive change.
It could be something as personal as a
void which needs filling or a relationship
that requires attending. But the perceived
need may also be the precarious situation
of the Other, some sort of crisis that must
be addressed—one need within another.
No matter the number of needs, “hospitality is expressed in terms of the needs
of the host, not in terms of the duty to
the visitor, stranger or arrivant” (Nursoo
2007). If there were no perceived need,
there would be no welcome by a host; and
if there were no welcome by a host, there
would be no expression of hospitality.
In the welcoming of hospitality, there
is an invitation “delivered” to the Other,
thus making it conditional hospitality rather than unconditional or absolute hos-
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pitality (see Derrida 2000a, 2000b, 2005).
It could be a verbal utterance of “Welcome,” a silent nod or hand gesture, a
note, the opening of a door, or any combination thereof. Unlike Derrida, however, I do not see this sort of hospitality
that is made conditional by an invitation, to involve, in any typical situation,
rights, exchanges, contracts, or violence.
For Derrida, conditional hospitality is
composed of all this and is thus limited,
whereas the law of hospitality is absolute. He writes: “This principle demands,
it even creates the desire for, a welcome
without reserve and without calculation,
an exposure without a limit to whoever
arrives [l’arrivant]” (2005: 6). And yet
Derrida himself recognizes in hospitality
part of what I find to be important in how
persons live their lives:
Yet a cultural or linguistic community, a family, a nation [I would add
‘person’], cannot suspend, at the least,
even betray this principle of absolute
hospitality: to protect a ‘home’, without doubt, by guaranteeing property
and what is ‘proper’ to itself against
the unlimited arrival of the other; but
also to attempt to render the welcome
effective, determined, concrete, to put
it into practice [le mettre en oeuvre]
(2005: 6).

The doors to my flat and office are
locked. Those places are not available to
the Other without an invitation to enter.
It is up to me. Although I open up my
home or office to the Other, it remains
mine unless I decide otherwise. And there
are certain expectations by both parties,
100

expectations that might not be met. For
example, I expect not to be murdered by
the one I welcome; I suspect that the person who enters my home or office expects
the same. But it is the nature of expectations to be open to the possibility of
denial, of the expectation not being met.
Hence, the invitation and entry are by
their very nature “risky.” Welcoming the
Other includes a “risk,” which means that
the host, as well as the “invited” one, who
must decide whether to take a risk by accepting the hospitality, could incur some
cost even if the cost were simply that the
interaction does not enhance or open the
moral space between the two.
Could hospitality with its invitation
and risk taking also be a part of the life of
the hyperintellectual? Yes, if we take the
virtue of courage to be a form of risk taking, and a risk taking that is prior to the
ability to continue criticism when one’s
fellow citizens are silent or complicit. It
is a risk of extending an invitation to the
Other to engage in the cooperative venture of hospitality. By not taking sides
and being a good epistemic agent, the hyperintellectual is behaving courageously
and taking a risk of extending an invitation to everyone as Other. It is through
defending and criticizing positions of all
parties at some point that the hyperintellectual offers the gesture of hospitality.
It is risking hospitality in its broadest, in
its most non-ideological sense, that the
hyperintellectual further contributes to
democracy building. This could be the
hyperintellectual’s most important contribution. Perhaps hospitality rather than
oppositionality is what the hyperintellec-
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tual strives for on the road to democratization. The outcome is uncertain, but if
successful, showing hospitality
inevitably involves us in a sympathetic
passing over into the other’s life and
stories and a coming back into our own
life and stories enriched with new insight. To see life through a story which
requires us to welcome the stranger is
to be forced to recognize the dignity
of the stranger who does not share our
story (Fasching 1994: 9).

Clearly, taking such a risk means that
we are forced to attend to the Other and
to be addressed by the moral circumstance, thereby provoking concern and respect for the Other. Unfortunately, there
is no easy solution to preventing ethnic
nationalism from constraining moral space through demonizing the Other and
leading people to be inordinately combative. As I previously suggested, however,
empathy appears to be sometimes overwhelmed by combativeness in members
of different ethno-religious groups, such
that the resulting animosities are to a degree taken to be a part of their psyches.
But empathy need not be lost, misplaced,
or overwhelmed for long; it can be rekindled, though it may take great effort on
the part of many. It is at this juncture that
hospitality becomes important, for one
must decide to take a “risk” and extend
hospitality to the Other. The absence of
such a gesture may well result in the moral space remaining compressed or closed.
In a word, hospitality is a portal through
which we all can enter shared moral space,
though there is no guarantee that we will
Global Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

all make the trip. But it is when hospitality takes the form of intercultural education, storytelling, and moral imagination
that real progress is likely; and there is no
reason why the hyperintellectual cannot
become a participant in this process. This
is especially true of the hyperintellectual
who is perhaps more like a moral theorist, someone who projects new conceptions of moral life through acts of moral
imagination (see Louden 1992: 152-153).
While I agree that the hyperintellectual can, in a very practical sense, help
others to engage, it is expected that some
individuals may still not be inclined to be
hospitable, in which case they must be
“prompted” to do so. This is where the IC
must be willing to accept the paradox of
democracy formation as a condition of its
work in religiously and ethnically fragmented societies. If ethno-religious communities are unwilling to engage with one
another, then the IC must dictate institutions and policies that require members
of these communities to work and live
together, allowing them greater opportunities to engage in hospitality so as to
move closer to creating their own democracy. Ultimately, “risk taking” is what will
bring about a democratic culture in the
Balkans. “Playing it safe” will only perpetuate the undemocratic status quo. Change
will come about when enough people recognize, both theoretically and practically, that hospitality is essential for moral
agency, and that concern and respect for
one’s fellow human beings, as well as for
the creation of a democratic culture are
required. Once again, the hyperintellectual can be useful, though in this case it
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would be in terms of offering theoretical (philosophical) support for the moral legitimacy of the IC’s peace-building
efforts. By clarifying these efforts as instances of self-protectionism and autonomy-enhancing, the hyperintellectual can
make strides in reducing the divisiveness
between parties who are at odds with one
another.
However, to say that the hyperintellectual can “make strides” by employing
a philosophical argument, often made
impenetrable by formal logic and technical language, so as to demonstrate that
the peace-building efforts would be more
justice-, equality-, or liberty-producing
than its contenders, is not to say it is the
argument that must prevail. Indeed, there
may be many prevailing arguments unless
they are reduced in some arbitrary fashion. This idea of “contrary positions that
simultaneously survive,” developed most
prominently by Amartya Sen, can serve as
a reminder that the absence of a zero sum
debate need not bring decision-making
to an immediate halt. Sen puts the point
thus: “Arbitrary reduction of multiple and
potentially conflicting principles to one
solitary survivor, guillotining all the other
evaluative criteria, is not, in fact, a prerequisite for getting useful and robust conclusions on what should be done” (2009:
4).43
I have sketched a theoretically compelling framework for situating the hyperintellectual in modern-day civil sociSen (2009: 14) aptly cites Bernard Williams
in this regard: “Disagreement does not necessarily have to be overcome” (Williams 1985:
133).
43
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ety building and democratization, as well
as a practical scheme that recognizes this
intellectual as a catalyst for the creation
of democratic culture. Although I have
perhaps failed to make a convincing argument tying the hyperintellectual to
democratization, it nonetheless strikes
me as encouraging that the inflationary
model of morality has brought us to a
plausible framework for the best the hyperintellectual has to offer. It is my hope
that this effort to offer a practically oriented theoretical framework in this way
can not only limit the slandering of the
intellectual in the public domain, but also
may open up new possibilities for the creation of democratic culture in places like
the Balkans.
Estrangement qua Suicide:
The Curse of the Hyperintellectual

In a sense, the hyperintellectual informs
us all, including the nationalist and the
interventionist, that our predicament is
like staring at bits of shattered mirror. As
we poke at the shards, declares Kwame
Anthony Appiah, we see that
each shard reflects one part of a complex truth from its own particular angle....[However] you will find parts
of the truth (along with much error)
everywhere and the whole truth nowhere. The deepest mistake,...is to
think that your little shard of mirror
can reflect the whole (2006: 8).

Understanding can only be achieved
within a group. But the costs and bene-
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fits are not distributed equally within that
group. The work of the hyperintellectual
involves a collective-action problem, insofar as all those who live that “way of
life” incur the costs, but huge segments
of society share the benefits that might
come from such work. Perhaps this is the
best that the hyperintellectual can hope
to attain. The hyperintellectual has contemplated, intervened, taken a risk, and
incurred the cost. The hyperintellectual
goes about trying to change the world
but at the price of alienating almost everyone. But this is to be expected given
the five defining but often countervailing
features that drive the hyperintellectual.
While being the caring insider, person
of action, and the political educator may
be quite appealing to many, wielding an
unrestrained critical eye in a non-partisan (quirky) way may eventually drive
away any supporters, thereby reducing his
or her effectiveness. To put this in more
concrete terms, it is when colleagues do
not respond to emails or return phone
calls, producers cancel television interviews, blogs become unpopular and officials of a university or other institutions
question their “loyalty” and, thus, their
usefulness, that the impact of the hyperintellectual within civil society begins to
shrink. Being marginalized may be the
universal experience of the hyperintellectual. Perhaps at some point a threshold is
reached whereby the hyperintellectual is
silenced.
Although reason may well continue
to rule, visceral feelings of inadequacy,
resentment, and rage will remain. This
is the existential fury that must be reGlobal Outlook (2016) 1, 1: 51-110

strained. Yet it is only by living against the
grain and enduring the estrangement and
fury that the hyperintellectual holds to
his or her vocation, readying a new set of
projects for the following day. Day in and
day out the hyperintellectual transgresses
boundaries and combats monological and
dialogical dogmatism. It is a struggle that
is soothed by various technologies; but
the Internet does not inoculate the hyperintellectual against estrangement. But
so what! The fact that there is estrangement to be endured is itself a kind of
success—for it means that courage, compassion, and hospitality are still alive. The
practice of virtue remains alive and well.
Perhaps the economist E.F. Schumacher
had it right:
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The violence that is in the process of
destroying the world is the cold, calculating, detached, heartless, and relentless violence that springs from
over-extended minds working out of
control of under-developed hearts. A
person who does not feel his thoughts
but merely entertains them...is capable
of limitless violence....
Modern civilization can survive
only if it begins again to educate the
heart…for modern human beings are
now far too clever to be able to survive
without wisdom (1977: 313).

If nothing else, a sense of such single-mindedness and sacrifice for a more
democratic and humane society offers
people a basis for hope even when circumstances seem to provide none. Yet
there is never any guarantee of success
beyond this minimalist sense. The hy103
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perintellectual may come and go without
having any discernible impact on the direction of the society.
Perhaps the effectiveness of any single
hyperintellectual is often short-lived, although the collective impact of a growing
number of hyperintellectuals may have
long-term consequences for democratization efforts. Gaining momentum for such
change may be even more likely if the siphon theory of social change is adopted
by the hyperintellectual; if he or she can
“locate the strategic set of people…who
could create such momentum” (Lederach
2005: 94). If enough of the right people in
Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere become
convinced that the world is not black and
white, democracy and human relations
may have a better chance to spread.
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